University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--History

History

2019

KEEPERS OF THEIR PARTY: HAPPY CHANDLER, ALBEN BARKLEY
AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT’S FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF THE
DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Christa Kieffer
University of Kentucky, christa.kieffer@uky.edu
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2019.425

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Kieffer, Christa, "KEEPERS OF THEIR PARTY: HAPPY CHANDLER, ALBEN BARKLEY AND FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT’S FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY" (2019). Theses and Dissertations-History. 56.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/history_etds/56

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the History at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--History by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s)
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File.
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to
register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements
above.
Christa Kieffer, Student
Dr. Tracy Campbell, Major Professor
Dr. David Hamilton, Director of Graduate Studies

KEEPERS OF THEIR PARTY:
HAPPY CHANDLER, ALBEN BARKLEY AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT’S
FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

________________________________________
THESIS
________________________________________
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
in the College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky
By
Christa Elise Kieffer
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Tracy Campbell, Professor of History
Lexington, Kentucky
2019
Copyright © Christa Elise Kieffer 2019

ABSTRACT OF THESIS
KEEPERS OF THEIR PARTY:
HAPPY CHANDLER, ALBEN BARKLEY AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT’S
FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY
This thesis argues that the 1938 Kentucky Democratic primary was a critical
moment for the New Deal and the Democratic Party. Furthermore, it demonstrates the
fractures forming within the southern wing of the party. Through this primary the paper
examines peoples’ perceptions of a changing democracy. One that they believed included
a much more powerful president and meddling bureaucracy. It details the major points of
the campaign, including Franklin Roosevelt’s visit to the state the famous poisoning
accusations, and the corruption within the Works Progress Administration.
KEYWORDS: Liberalism, Conservatism, Democratic Party, Kentucky, New Deal

Christa Elise Kieffer
(Name of Student)
08/26/2019
Date

KEEPERS OF THEIR PARTY:
HAPPY CHANDLER, ALBEN BARKLEY AND FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT’S
FIGHT FOR THE SOUL OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

By
Christa Elise Kieffer

Dr. Tracy Campbell
Director of Thesis
Dr. David Hamilton
Director of Graduate Studies
08/26/2019
Date

DEDICATION
To Mutti

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 1
Chapter 1: “The Heart and Soul of Americanism:” The Early Campaign and the
Expansion of Presidential Powers. ............................................................................................ 11
Chapter 2: “Copperheads Among Us:” Roosevelt’s Purge ................................................... 34
Chapter 3: Poison Water, Poison Victory: The Final Months of the Campaign ................. 56
Conclusion.................................................................................................................................... 80
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 86
Vita ................................................................................................................................................ 91

iii

Introduction
As the train entered Cincinnati Ohio, President Roosevelt was resting in
preparation for a full day of travel and speeches on behalf of Alben Barkley, one of his
most ardent supporters, who was in the midst of an intense battle for the Democratic
nomination for the senate. When the train entered the station, his challenger, a
charismatic and always smiling, A.B. “Happy” Chandler boarded and contently took his
seat in the dining car. The six-mile trip to Covington, Kentucky, where the president’s
first speech was set to be given, was cordial and quiet, however; this would only last a
short time. The train arrived at its destination and the occupants filed out. There was a car
waiting to take the three men to the racetrack where Roosevelt would make his speech.
The president entered first, sitting in the far-right seat. Happy saw his chance to insert
himself into the spotlight, nearly leaping over him to claim the middle seat. This ensured
that he would be seen by everybody lining the streets and captured by every photographer
sitting next to the president. Chandler’s smiling face would be on the front page of many
newspapers the next morning.
It was a long and winding road that lead to the president’s interference in the 1938
Democratic primary. Throughout the 1920s, Kentucky politics were incredibly factional
and controlled by groups of prominent men. The governor was not at all an unchecked
ruler of the state. Much of the true power lay behind the scenes with various powerful
bosses, the most prominent among these in the nineteenth century was William “Percy”
Haly. They often gained their influence through the practice of distributive politics.
During an era of little government involvement, these bosses provided needed relief to a
1

Kentucky that struggled for much of the 1920s. If one wanted to take power in Kentucky,
they needed to gain the support of as many of the bosses as they could. Chandler was able
to garner the attention of a group of powerful bosses, John Talbott, Ben Johnson, Robert
Bingham, and William Haly, that would be critical to his ascent to power. As the 1936
gubernatorial race was nearing, J.C.W. Beckham, a well-known and powerful Kentucky
politician, pulled himself out of the running. This cleared the way for Chandler to be
entered the race on behalf of the Beckham-Haly-Bingham faction.1 2
After Ruby Laffoon took office many of the issues that Kentucky had been
experiencing since the Great Depression were exacerbated. Over 1932 the state’s deficit
increased by $2,000,000. This caused him to struggle to meet matching fund thresholds
for any New Deal programs. Laffoon would attempt to solve some of these fiscal issues
by raising the liquor tax, however; he also significantly lowered the property tax and
spent $250,000 to make Mammoth Cave a national park. All of this contributed to
Kentucky’s fiscal crisis. In his attempt to alleviate the financial woes of Kentucky
Laffoon committed a cardinal sin. He instituted a three percent sales tax. With the 1935
gubernatorial race approaching the bosses decided to put forth Thomas Rhea as the
replacement candidate for Laffoon.3
As Charles Roland would put it, “Chandler was fresh; he was fun; he was
different. And still, in the dark Depression days of the 1930s, he made a tremendous
impression on the voters who wanted someone new and sought a change from the old
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politics of despair.” He utilized a unique and new style of oratory where his speeches
were shorter and he called people in the crowd out by name. Most importantly, he
promised to save the state from “Ruby, Rhea, and ruin.”4
As lieutenant governor of Kentucky under Ruby Laffoon in 1935, Chandler used
a provision from the state constitution that allowed him to become governor if Laffoon
left the state. Once the governor took a trip to Washington, Happy sprang into action,
called a for a special session of the legislature to enact a new primary law, a law which
would eventually help him become governor in 1936. Soon after his ascension to the
highest office in Kentucky politics, the only thirty-eight-year-old Chandler quickly made
his mark. Taking after Huey Long, whom Happy reportedly spent some time shadowing
in Louisiana just before his death in 1935, he began to push out those who refused to take
secondary roles, which included many who helped him get elected to office and allowed
him to construct a powerful political machine. He would go on to take after another
mentor in his policy: Harry Byrd. Chandler quickly reorganized the state government and
balanced the budget, which brought needed stability to Kentucky. However, believing he
was destined for more (including the presidency), was already looking for his next move.
Since Kentucky governors could not succeed themselves, and Chandler would not accept
a step back and set his eyes on the senate in 1938.5
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The incumbent, Alben Barkley, had a record in Kentucky politics dating back to
the late 1890s. Early in his career, he gained the support of two pivotal groups, rural and
labor, by championing various reforms in the early 1900s. As a congressman during the
Wilson administration, Barkley watched as the president exercised strong leadership over
the party. During World War I, he created the Food Administration, Fuel Administration,
and the National War Labor Board, all of which Barkley had a hand in passing. He would
also, during the Wilson administration, promote better roads for the rural population of
Kentucky. The resulting unity, purpose, and success that this strong national leadership
brought to the Democratic Party taught Barkley a lesson that he would carry with him for
the rest of his career. He was predisposed to supporting the New Deal from its inception.
Starting from his very first day as Senate Majority Leader, he used his booming
voice to trumpet his support for the New Deal. As soon as he took office, he played a
critical role in pushing through much of the legislation that defined the Second New
Deal. He sat on the committees that drafted the Social Security and the Revenue Acts in
1935, and also devised a compromise that allowed the passing of the Public Utility
Holding Act in the same year. This valuable Barkley was integral in many other
struggles, such as defending the Agricultural Adjustment Act after portions of it were
deemed unconstitutional. He, with Roosevelts blessing, became Senate Majority Leader.
He would continue to become one of the presidents most vital allies in the senate by
helping push through more critical New Deal legislation like the Fair Labor and
Standards Act in 1938 and he criticized the Supreme Court for resistance to many of
Roosevelt's plans. He exemplified a New Deal Democrat.

4

The question remains: Why would Roosevelt break tradition and get between
these two colossal figures? There was significant division developing within the
Democratic party. The New Deal’s shifting of the Democratic Party’s objectives toward
solving the problems of the Great Depression caused dissolution among certain
Democrats. First and foremost, Southerners felt particularly threatened by the New
Deal’s increase of executive powers. The New Deal brought more federal control causing
fear that the laisse faire treatment that they had received, particularly regarding race, may
be coming to an end.
However, there was more widespread dissent due to several other reasons. The
supreme court had begun to apply pressure to the New Deal, declaring several major
pieces of legislation unconstitutional. Therefore, Roosevelt attempted to reorganize the
judiciary in his favor with his infamous court-packing plan in 1937. This, coupled with an
executive reorganization bill, made many fearful that the president was seeking to acquire
dictatorship. The president attempted to justify his plan by asserting that he would expand
the Supreme Court to lessen the workload of the older members. Nobody was fooled by
this, and congress, including many Democrats, shut it down. A final factor that
exacerbated the strife that was boiling beneath the Democratic Party was the Roosevelt
Recession, which cast doubts about the efficacy of the New Deal.6
These issues are what much of the dissent in the Democratic Party crystalized
over, however, tensions had been rising since as early as 1935, beginning with
Roosevelt’s Revenue Act. Furthermore, the rift between North and South, which veiled

6

David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 332-333

5

the true conflict between urban and rural, interest had been festering for some time. Due
to the court-packing fiasco Southern fears of federal encroachment through many New
Deal programs, and the Roosevelt Recession many now gained the courage to challenge
Roosevelt openly. Fate allowed the president to gain a favorable court through the death
of a justice, however; due to the rift developing within the Democratic party, he had no
vehicle to put legislation through.7
Roosevelt realized that the momentum of the New Deal may have been running
out. His solution: create a truly liberal Democratic Party. A Party which believed in the
interconnectedness of society, and thus in attempts to protect communities, individuals,
and the government itself from corporate power, the state would get involved to ensure a
basic level of subsistence. If this was to be achieved, the new liberal Democratic party
would need to be purged of its conservative elements and made to follow a more national
program. It is important to note that he did not want a one-party system, but two clearly
defined parties, with one being a liberal party that he could utilize to continue his New
Deal. The president saw his opportunity with the midterm elections of 1938. He would
attempt to remove the conservative elements of the part and defend the liberal New
Dealers from being ousted from their seats. While Roosevelt was unsuccessful in purging
those unsupportive of him and, ultimately in his attempts to reorganize the party, he was
successful at protecting seats that were already occupied by supportive senators.8
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Many have studied these various topics at length. Histories of Kentucky have
been composed by James C. Klotter and Lowell H. Harrison, which both give the
Democratic primary a treatment of a few pages and view it primarily from a state context.
Even more have studied the New Deal, its discontents, and the attempts to build a
consensus liberal party. Many of these authors relegate the Kentucky primary to a few
sentences. Walter Hixon wrote both an article and thesis about the Barkley-Chandler
contest, demonstrating that support Roosevelt and the New Deal were still high despite
his political blunder of attempting to pack the courts. However, much is still left unsaid
about massive changes to party politics and this rift between many in the democratic
party.
This work will argue that Kentucky was center stage in the fight to save the New
Deal and build a liberal Democratic party. The 1938 Democratic primary was one of the
most important single moments the presidents attempt to save a sputtering New Deal,
which had undergone several hardships. Its prestige had been damaged by the Roosevelt
Recession and the court-packing plan. Like the rest of the country, Kentuckians had
become skeptical of the New Deal. Despite this skepticism, many still voted in strongly
in its favor. What about the New Deal was making Americans uncomfortable? How
successful were Roosevelt’s attempts at creating a liberal Democratic party? How were
Americans dealing with the increase in executive power? These are all significant issues
that rose to the forefront of citizens minds. Examining this critical battle in Kentucky
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Oxford University Press, 1993), 62; Anthony J. Badger, The New Deal: The Depression Years(London, UK:
MacMillan, 1989), 271-272.
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may help answer some of these questions. This was also a vital fight for the New Deal for
another reason. Barkley was the president’s most important ally in the Senate. This was
Roosevelts majority leader. He had broken tradition and openly supported his nomination
to the post, and with many beginnings to lose faith it would have been a major
embarrassment to have his majority leader unseated by a more conservative Democrat.
Chapter one will tackle the early stages of the Kentucky campaign and the
changing perceptions of the president’s role in American politics. Roosevelt had greatly
expanded what many considered to be within the realm of presidential powers. He had
pushed to create public work program where workers were paid to do anything from
building public libraries to composing music. Many felt that the national government was
overstepping its bounds, especially as the national debt rose to unimaginable heights.
Furthermore, the national government was now taking responsibility for the wellbeing of
its people. This sparked debate over where this was the government's duty or not. Liberal
Democrats would argue that it was the very “heart and soul of Americanism” to help the
public during times of extreme economic stress. Conservative Democrats believed that
the national government was overspending and that it would be detrimental to the
economy as well as the work ethic of the population.9
Chapter two, “Copperheads Among Us,” will investigate Roosevelt’s attempts to
purge the party of its conservative elements and his visit to Kentucky. The president’s
trip to the Bluegrass State was particularly interesting in that Chandler would attempt to
hijack it and use its publicity to his own advantage. He would adeptly utilize the photo
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opportunities and somewhat neutral statements from the president to present a favorable
picture to weary Democrats. This chapter argues that the battle to keep Barkley in the
Senate was the most important of the purge due to his status as senate majority leader.
The importance of this victory was also magnified by the failure to win other races and a
rising conservative sentiment amongst the electorate. This chapter will also examine the
increasingly vocal calls for fiscal conservatism.
The final chapter, titled “Poison Water, Poison Victory,” will discuss the final
stages of the campaign. One of the larger controversies of the primary would occur in its
last days when Chandler fell ill and decided to assert that this was due to the poisoning of
a pitcher of waters at the hands of the Barkley organization. This had drastic implications
for the outcome of the campaign that many fail to acknowledge. Chandler went into
election day looking weak, as the newspapers had published pictures of him sick in bed
with his wife by his side for several weeks prior. This would soften the claims that
Chandler had made that he was the young and hearty candidate while Barkley was old
and weak. This event also came at an opportune time for Barkley, as he was struggling to
gather funds. This became such an issue that Harry Hopkins took an interest in the
situation, though he saw little success in remedying it. As August 6th drew near, there
were concerns that Barkley would completely run out of money and cease making
speeches. This episode allowed for a much-needed relief for the Barkley campaign and
certainly contributed to his victory.
Neither side would come out of the campaign unscathed. In the final months of
the primary, it would be discovered that both the Chandler and Barkley campaigns would
be accused of using patronage to gain support and funds. The Barkley organization was
9

found to have used the WPA to gain support, which dealt another blow to the New Deal
at a crucial time. It was alleged that workers jobs were threatened if they did not vote for
Barkley, drawing concerns that the very idea of government work programs was tainted
from the beginning. This gave firepower to anti-New Dealers during a time when the
New Deal was already struggling to rally support in the South. Kentucky would be
entangled in and exemplify not only in this controversy but the political climate
surrounding this attempt to gain a foothold and the struggles that came with it.

10

Chapter 1: “The Heart and Soul of Americanism:” The Early Campaign and the
Expansion of Presidential Powers.
As early as January, the main themes of the election would be brought to the
forefront. It became clear that this election would represent a fight to shape American
democracy. Alben Barkley, a long-time supporter of the president and his New Deal,
would go to battle to defend the principles that allowed their assent. He would fight to
continue an American Democracy that allowed for an executive that had exponentially
more power than ever before. Roosevelt had expanded presidential powers through his
work programs and increasing of the national debt. Barkley represented a faction of the
Democratic Party that subscribed to the idea of a strong executive who could utilize the
office to solve the pressing issues of the Great Depression. The party was supposed to
face these problems under the supervision of the president. This was, as Barkley called it,
the “heart and soul of Americanism.”10
Chandler’s campaign captured the backlash to this increase in the power of the
executive spurred on by the Roosevelt recession in 1937, occurring after many New Deal
programs began to be reduced in size. This economic downturn shook the confidence of
the much of the American public and left many feeling that “priming the pump” was now
a permanent function of the government. They had been frightened by the immense debt
that the government was racking up and this burden may have all been for nothing.
Chandler would balance the budget of Kentucky and tout a fiscally conservative message
thorough the campaign, specifically attacking the philosophy of pump priming. These

10
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philosophies would represent the rift within the Democratic Party, but they also
demonstrate a shift in the American system to a more powerful executive.
Roosevelt was also applying pressure to the Supreme Court, which caused people
to fear the future of the relationship between the executive and judicial branches of
government. His court-packing plan from 1937 had also created a split in the party.
Roosevelt’s attempt to gain a massive amount of influence over the supreme court made
many see him as a tyrant who was attempting to gain control over every aspect of
government. There would also be a brief controversy over a court seat early in the
primary that would ironically see Roosevelt being pressured by his opposition to make a
judicial appointment that would benefit them and avoid a fight. This would not be the last
time that the issue of judicial appointments would come up and it would be an issue from
the beginning to end it would be one of the driving issues of the campaign.
Kentucky was a microcosm of this struggle over the direction of American
democracy, and it would quickly be thrust into the national spotlight. The debate over the
building of a dam in Gilbertsville, Kentucky revolved around all of these issues. It
brought to the forefront many concerns over the president’s powers to appoint and, in this
case, remove personnel of New Deal programs. Many also used this project as an
example of the excessive spending of the government. This was because it was to be the
crowning achievement of the TVA and the most expensive dam the organization was to
produce. The Gilbertsville Dam, however, also brought to light another issue of
presidential power, because it would displace thousands of people from the town, which
it would flood once it was built. The executive was now removing thousands from their
homes and destroying farmland in an area filled with farmers by claiming it was for a
12

greater good. This concerned many in the Tennessee Valley and Gilbertsville and would
become an outlet for their dissent. The early stages of this campaign were filled with
debate about the direction of American Democracy and many of the events depict the
uncertainty of the place of the executive in American democracy.
Once January of 1938 had arrived, the time left for Governor Chandler to make a
decision about how to proceed in his political career was running out. Kentucky’s state
constitution did not allow governors to succeed themselves, therefore he began to eye a
seat in the Senate. Alben Barkley’s seat was up for reelection in August; however, he was
a very popular and seasoned political veteran. Chandler knew that beating him would be
extremely difficult, in fact, it would be nearly impossible. The other seat, occupied by M.
M. Logan, would not be available until 1942, which was too long to wait for the
impatient governor, and would put his career in limbo for several years.
Knowing that that he would most likely be facing a tough opponent in Chandler,
Barkley also began preparing for his campaign. He announced a dinner scheduled for
January 22nd where he would declare that he was running for reelection, which caused
much debate amongst the Chandler camp of how to react. Chandler, along with
Lieutenant Governor Keen Johnson, was sent an invitation. Chandler was even slated to
introduce Barkley. This was most likely a last-minute extension of good will toward the
governor, allowing him a final chance to back down and not enter the Democratic
primary. Chandler decided to decline to attend the dinner under the pretense that he had
conflicting obligation on that Saturday evening. He then scrambled to put together a
dinner of his own hosted by Frederick A. Wallis, where he would be the guest of honor.
However, Johnson asserted that he chose not to attend the dinner because he believed that
13

Chandler would soon be opposing Barkley, revealing the real motivations behind their
decision. These dinners set the tone for the upcoming elections.11
At the Barkley dinner, Roosevelt took his first opportunity to get involved,
sending a letter to be read to the crowd. The president went on to say in this letter that
“These are critical times” and the best men are needed in congress to deal with these
issues. He then writes that Barkley exhibited a host of favorable qualities, these included
patriotism, integrity, and courage, which “give him exceptional equipment as legislator
and as leader.” After the recession of 1937-1938, there was a dramatic increase in works
programs. If these were to be pushed through congress Roosevelt would need his trusted
senate majority leader to be reelected. Surprising no one, Roosevelt had made his choice
in the primary before the race had even began, and he had chosen Alben Barkley.12
The attendees of Barkley’s dinner remained surprisingly quiet about Governor
Chandler. He was only mentioned once when Senator Sherman Minton from Indiana
when said, “We can’t fish in the Ohio River without getting a license from Happy
Chandler.” Rather, the focus of Barkley’s speech was the same as it would be throughout
the campaign. He proceeded to discuss the difficult times that Americans were facing, his
experience as a legislator, assess the limits of democracy, and propagated the messages of
the president. He did all of this while also declaring that he would run for reelection. The
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calm tone of this meeting differed from the luncheon that took place earlier, with the
subject of Chandler’s speech being “Kentucky Has Lead and Will Lead Again.”13
The Chandler luncheon was a more fiery affair, and left few doubts about the
Governor’s future plans. Chandler declared: “When I go back to Frankfort this afternoon,
and I am going back this afternoon…” The audience of over 1000 members of the
government broke out into cheers before Chandler finished by saying, “I won’t call on
any senators or any other fellows from the North to come help me.” He would continue
throughout the campaign to attempt to make Barkley seem like an outsider, focusing on
his lack of time spent in Kentucky and his cooperation with Northern senators.14
The governor would begin by telling those at the luncheon that if they wanted him
to “serve at any other capacity” he would be confident in leaving the reins to Lieutenant
Governor Johnson, and since he had taken care of business in Frankfort he “may see it fit
to take a hand in theirs,” referring to Barkley and the crowd at his dinner that was
comprised overwhelmingly of federal employees. Although it was not made official,
Chandler was now in the fight for the democratic nomination and everybody knew it.
Regardless, he would again attempt to maneuver his way into the Senate without having
to go through the messy political battle that was to take place. Barkley’s organization
would begin preparing for a bout with the Governor, telling him about the “great
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pressure” being placed on Chandler to run against him and that “he ought not entertain
hope of getting by without Chandler opposition.”15
Judicial appointments would be at the forefront of peoples’ minds throughout the
election. Roosevelt had battled with the Supreme Court since his election. Once New
Deal legislation made its way through Supreme Court many pieces were deemed
unconstitutional. This included many major programs, namely the National Industrial
Recovery Act and important parts of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. This would spur
much of the second New Deal, as its goal was to amend some of the pieces of legislation
that the courts took issue with. Roosevelt’s struggles with the supreme court were only
beginning. After Roosevelt achieved a landslide win in 1936, his confidence soared. He
would attempt to use this wave public support to wash away his largest roadblock. He
then launched his infamous court packing plan in an attempt to achieve a more favorable
court. He had also argued that life tenure for judges “was not intended to create a static
judiciary.” Roosevelt immediately attempted to quell the fears of those he anticipated
resistance from. He argued to Congress that “since the early days of the republic…the
problem of personnel of the courts has needed the attention of Congress” and that life
tenure for judges “was not intended to create a static judiciary.”16
Southern Democrats were particularly uneasy about this intervention in judicial
branch, in fact, they viewed as a fight for their very survival. Amongst the shifting tides
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of a Democratic Party that was becoming increasingly more diverse, Southern Democrats
felt that they were becoming a smaller minority. They were often at odds with the union
members, immigrants, and urbanites that were flooding the party. Their more frightening
opposition, however, came from African Americans that were now becoming
increasingly more comfortable abandoning the party of Lincoln. Roosevelt’s message
was well understood: If they were not willing to change, they should leave the party. The
battle for control of the Supreme Court was seen to be Southern Democrats’ last stand.17
Roosevelt’s pressure on the court was, therefore, seen as a serious affront to
Southerners. The president was seen as attempting to extend his power over the judicial
branch, which frightened them enough, but he seemingly doing this to push them out of
the party. The court packing issue was more than just an ideological battle between
Roosevelt and the judges. A law had been passed in 1932 that severely cut the retirement
of the judges. Roosevelt’s proposed plan had a very particular wording. It designated that
the president would be able to appoint a judge for everyone over seventy years old, but it
also added that they need to have held a “commission as judge of any such court or courts
at least ten years.” This was the included because the requirement to receive a full
pension. This plan was the result of a longstanding debate surrounding the retirement of
judges that was exacerbated by the 1932 revisions to pensions. Roosevelt’s plan was not
to pack the court, but to get older judges who were able to receive a full pension to retire.
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The ideological motivation behind this, however, became the focal point and caused
alarm to many during the 1938 primaries.18
Many Kentuckians were among those who feared this intervention, and once the
campaign was underway letters began to flood in to Chandler that demonstrated dividing
lines between the candidates and the party. Democrats who felt this way and attempted to
distinguish themselves from Roosevelt Democrats by creating new political identities.
One man wrote to Chandler saying “i am a 100 percent Democrat. O.K. believe me.”
These people saw and understood the fundamental change that was taking place in the
American political system, and their political self-identification reflected this. The
Democratic Party was split by more than just the typical identifiers of conservative or
liberal, and they would attempt to distinguish themselves by their support of Roosevelt’s
attempts to expand presidential powers.19
Many particularly made clear their anger and resistance to the president’s
meddling in state affairs. Letters came from all over to voice their opinion on the now
highly visible and pivotal Kentucky Campaign. One Massachusetts woman wrote that
“we are anxious to get going, to show the NEW DEALERS by our ballot what we think
of them. We hope to show them whoes ‘baby has the measles.’” In her eyes, New Deal
democrats represented an “UNAMERICAN pressure” on the legislative and judicial
process. Another emphasized that when he saw the president interfering in state elections
he ceased “being a Roosevelt Democrat,” and declared that he wanted return to “old time
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democracy.” This Kentuckian understood that there was a clear split within the
Democratic Party, but they also grasped that that there was a fundamental change taking
place to the American government. To them, the president was overextending his reach
with the New Deal and what they saw as its excessive spending. They also viewed
Roosevelt’s pressuring of the Supreme Court to pass his legislation as an attack on the
very foundations of American democracy.20
Judicial appointments would directly affect the campaign several times. The first
would come with the death of Federal Circuit Judge Charles H. Moorman. This provided
another opportunity for Chandler and many predicted that Kentucky Senator M. M.
Logan would be given the seat and Chandler would take his place in the Senate, allowing
for Roosevelt to avoid a messy battle between Barkley and Happy. Others saw this as
well, and speculation began to run rampant once the seat opened up, many assuming that
Chandler would again make a push for Logan to be appointed. They were right, however;
the Governor would take a more direct approach. A few prominent Democrats arranged a
meeting between him and President Roosevelt at the White House to discuss the matter.
Chandler traveled to Washington in early February hoping to make a deal for a Senate
seat. In his half hour conversation, he supposedly asked, “You want Barkley renominated
and reelected don’t you?” Though he would not leave with a deal, he would tell a crowd
“I wasn’t bluffed and I wasn’t scared.”21

20

Wallace Bacheller to Albert B. Chandler, February 11, 1938, Box 45, Folder 1, Happy Chandler Collection
1920-1974, University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, KY; James W. Butts to Albert B.
Chandler, July 6, 1938, Box 45, Folder 1, Happy Chandler Collection 1920-1974, University of Kentucky
Special Collections, Lexington, KY.
21
“Governor, Back From Capital, ‘Wasn’t Bluffed’,” The Lexington Herald, February 3, 1938.

19

Barkley stated that he was unwilling to enter into a “conspiracy” to give Logan
the federal court seat and create the vacancy in the Senate. He stated, “For months I have
been threatened from Frankfort with opposition in my race for re-election to the senate
unless I entered into a conspiracy which would have involved Senator Logan, the
president and me.” Barkley called this possible deal “contemptable” and argued that in all
of his years of governance he had never “entered into a bargain, trade deal, or conspiracy,
either to obtain any man’s vote, or to prevent any man from running against [him].” He
capped off his statement to the people by saying, “I value my own self-respect and the
respect of the people of Kentucky above any consideration of political or official titles.”22
Chandler would push back against these accusations of immorality. He told a
crowd after being informed of Barkley’s statement, “I don’t care if he makes any deal.”
He then took it farther by stating that “He [Barkley] issued a statement bragging about his
integrity. I am so well known I don’t have to issue any statement to brag about my
integrity.” Chandler would also call back to the familiar dividing line developing in the
party. He argued the “The southern senators are helping me,” mentioning that he had the
support of many top conservative democrats, like Harry Byrd were on his side. The
governor would also deny that the meeting had anything to do with the judicial
appointment. When asked if he was satisfied with his visit with the president, he told
reporters that “I have nothing to be ‘satisfied’ about. I didn’t come to ask for aid.”
Chandler did, however, allude that he would challenge Barkley. When a reporter asked
him if he was joining the fight Chandler replied, “He’ll have an opponent,” and if a
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campaign was to develop “there won’t be any grass growing in place where we travel.”
The impatient young governor was convinced that he was destined for national politics,
and his early successes may have made him believe he was invincible. After this trip to
Washington and the eventual appointment of Stanley Reed there were certainly few
doubters about whether the governor would oppose Barkley.23
As Chandler returned to Louisville, his confidence sored. He told all the attendees
of the luncheon that he had not made his mind up as to whether he would run against
Barkley. But Chandler followed this statement up by telling the crowd “I may be elected
president of the United States next time,” revealing his ultimate ambition. He also fired
back at Barkley’s attacks on his integrity, telling the crowd he could “keep his head held
high.” He even went as far as assuring the crowd that Lieutenant Governor Keen Johnson
would easily take on the role of governor and continue his programs. Chandler then
ended his speech by telling the members of the crowd that “Kentucky will see the biggest
bandwagon it has ever seen. I am going to keep the tailgate down, and all of you who
want to get on can climb on.” Demonstrating that he was confident that he could ride this
wave of conservative sentiment that was rising throughout the country.24
While New Deal policies continued to fracture the Democratic Party, Chandler
was hardly a unifying force. Early in the campaign he would grasp for the Republican
vote and advocate for a voter registration and purgation law. The measure called for
ineligible voters to be removed from the rolls. His support of this law prompted
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damaging opposition from Louisville Democrats, some of whom argued that Chandler
was attempting to take advantage of “the almost limitless patronage attached to the office
of governor,” because it undermined the city’s current registration act. The state’s largest
urban center would pose stiff opposition to Chandler from the earliest part of the
campaign. The mayor even gave a speech where he stated, “I charge the Governor with
tampering with our election laws to their debasement and to his aggrandizement” and
asserted that Chandler was trying to establish a Soviet government.”25
The registration law was a particularly strong ammunition for anti-Chandler
Democrats to use against him. Chandler had built his campaign by decrying the
expansion of presidential powers. Yet, he was, as many Louisville Democrats would
argue, centralizing his power and spreading his influence into other areas of the state
government. The mayor told a crowd that he offers us a return to political conditions that
made of Kentucky a “dark and bloody ground of discord.” They were able to argue that
he was not being true to his campaign promises and that, with the removal of the old
registration laws he would be setting the states government back many years.26
Once April came, the two candidates’ paths would cross for the first time and
have their first opportunity to go head to head. They were both scheduled to address the
Democratic Women’s Club of Kentucky, during the final session of their annual two-day
convention. Barkley spent much of his time at the podium praising Roosevelt and the
national administration’s efforts to relive American citizens of the pains of the Great
Depression while “preserving the substance of Democracy.” He called for “every
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Kentuckian who knows how to fight for what he believes,” and to vote not only for the
Democratic Party, but for the “heart and soul of Americanism.” Barkley then declared
that “Loyalty to the President is the way to build a greater Democracy,” concluding that
he was proud to be a Democrat, because of the “way the Democratic party faced the
issues of the Great Depression under the supervision of the president.” Barkley was
appealing to those who believed that the increase in the powers of the president were
beneficial to them. He also acknowledged the result of this fundamental change was that
“The Democratic party has convinced the American people that the government is set up
to guard and guide them.” The very idea of the role of the federal government was influx.
While some believed that it was “unamerican,” the New Dealer faction believed that it
was the governments job to look out for the wellbeing of the public. This also meant that
it should regulate the economy and even go into debt if it would help the public. This
notion was the very guiding principle behind the New Deal and the speech was given
with all of the “Barkley brand” of tenacity that he had become so famous for, receiving
cheers throughout. Applause broke out particularly loud near the end of the speech, but
not for him, it was for Governor Chandler as he entered the ballroom where the
convention was being held.27
Barkley abruptly ended his speech, telling the audience that he did not want to
“take up time that ought to be occupied by someone else.” Chandler forced his way
through the cheering crowd and approached the podium with his usual wide smile. The
two candidates shook hands and muttered a few words as they passed each other. Happy
again used this opportunity to take jabs at his opponent and promote a state-centric
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message. He began by attempting to make Barkley seem like an outsider to Kentucky by
stating, “I have not been to North Carolina and I haven’t been to Europe,” which was a
reverence to Barkley’s recent vacation. However, Chandler would later go on to discuss
some of the larger issues of the campaign, saying pointedly that even though he was “a
friend of the president” he could not support the idea of a rubberstamp congress. In his
eyes, the president should not be extending his reach into the legislative and judicial
branch. The governor would also tell people that Barkley had ignored Kentuckian’s
welfare while collecting ten thousand dollars a year. It was only when Roosevelt came
along that any measures were taken to improve the situation of the state.28
People reacted in different ways to this idea of a congress built to simply pass the
legislation of the president. While there were some that agreed with Chandler and argued
that Barkley was a not “a man of his own ideas,” many also saw the senator as more of an
advisor to the president, and any disagreement that they may have is resolved in private
before it is presented to the public. One person made the argument that Barkley cannot be
fired by the president, therefore; he has no incentive other than his own convictions to
support the president. They also asserted that the job of the majority leader was to keep
order within the party and advocate for the president. This person concluded that the
defeat of Barkley in the primary would mean turmoil for the party. They further stated
that “Kentucky Democrats have the destiny of their party in their keeping. Their action at
the primary, August 6, will either avert or precipitate a disastrous party crisis.” This
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assessment demonstrates the acute awareness that the American public had of the
importance of this election. It was understood that the party system was undergoing
intense and expansive changes.29
Happy would continue attempting to appeal to those “one hundred percent
Democrats” throughout the speech, however, he also touched on his record as governor
and touted a fiscally conservative message. He began by remarking, “I am a man of
action, not a man of words,” which would become somewhat of a campaign slogan. He
continued by claiming federal spending should be reduced and quoted a speech by
Barkley from 1932 where he stated, “We propose to reduce the expenses of the
Government not only for its own sake and that of the people, but as an example to smaller
units throughout the Nation.” He further emphasized that Kentucky “took that advice”
and he reduced the state budget till they were “living within [their] means.” He further
argued for fiscal conservatism by addressing his critics claims that social security
payments in Kentucky should be raised. Happy claimed that “Colorado gave more than
we are giving, and now has gone $4,000,000 in debt.30
He would also emphasize to his constituents that he was not averse to helping
those in need. Chandler sent a letter to one man that pointed out all he had done to help
disabled servicemen and “war orphans,” while also asserting that Barkley had been
“partly responsible for denying thousands of deserving veterans compensation.” He then
ended the letter with the statement “Replace a man with a record of years with a man
with a record of accomplishment.” Statements like these would continue throughout the
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campaign, as Chandler attempted to straddle a line that would place him as opposed to
the extent of the New Deal but not still willing to provide relief and take action. Both
candidates had argued effectively to their respective constituents, and the issues that
would surround the campaign were becoming clearly visible. His organization would also
begin to level their first accusations of foul play within the WPA. Chandler’s campaign
manager asserted that WPA funds were being used for political purposes. An investigator
would be sent to look into these claims and determined that he could not prove that there
was any wrongdoing. However, these claims would come back to haunt both candidates
in the future.31
Kentucky would be placed in the national spotlight several times during this
debate over the bounds of American democracy. Throughout the early part of the
campaign debate raged in Congress over a prospective dam to be built by the Tennessee
Valley Authority on the Tennessee River near Gilbertsville Kentucky, a small town
around twenty miles from Paducah. The TVA had elicited controversy. When it was
being passed, Roosevelt was asked what the political philosophy behind it was and
answered that he would “tell them it’s neither fish nor fowl, but whatever it is it will taste
awfully good to the people of the Tennessee Valley.” While the people of the Tennessee
Valley often appreciated the TVA, this ambiguity often drew concern. The conversation
around the Gilbertsville Dam almost always revolved around the overextension of
executive powers. The dam had been in the works since 1933, but in 1938 tensions would
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boil over. In March, Roosevelt fired the chairman of the TVA, Arthur Morgan, igniting
controversy over the president’s ability to control these organizations.32
After a period of turmoil among the board members of the TVA, Morgan began to
publicly accuse his colleges of “improprieties.” One Republican senator equated the TVA
to an “Authoritarian State” and called David Lilienthal (another board member of the
TVA) a “Hitler in short pants.” He also argued that Morgan was being “liquidated” for
not following the administrations orders. The president organized several meetings at the
White House where Morgan would refuse to answer his questions and eventually to
participate in the proceedings at all. Morgan would go so far as to tell Roosevelt that the
executive held no authority over his position, stating that “No action on my part is
necessary at the present moment.” A time later, on March 22, it was announced that he
had been fired by the president. Roosevelt listed several reasons for this, among them was
“Refusing to submit to the demand of the Chief Executive” and to provide “any reason”
why he should not be removed. This led many to now question the extent of the
president’s appointive and removal powers.33
The same day that Morgan’s removal was announced, the bill to appropriate
$2,613,000 to begin work on the Gilbertsville Dam was in front of the House. After news
of Morgan’s removal spread, the House voted the bill down 186 to 157. Many expected
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the issue of Morgan’s firing to go to the Supreme Court. The House had decided to pull
back on the dam and promoted a congressional investigation into TVA spending.
Roosevelt and other supporters of the dam began damage control immediately. Many
noted that this was supposed to the TVA’s crowning achievement. One senator even
argued that the completion of this project was necessary for the “proper rounding out of
the program.” While Roosevelt would acknowledge that congress was well within their
rights to investigate and undertake a “fair” legislative inquiry, but he also argued that he
fired Morgan to avoid setting a precedent that would slow government administration. As
president, it was his job to make sure the law executed swiftly, which was a guiding
principle of the New Deal as well. Barkley would join in the fight by ensuring a “fair”
investigation. He blocked immediate consideration of a resolution for a senatorial
investigation that was put forth by several rivals of the TVA before the president’s
message was even read. On March 31, the resolution for a joint probe was sent to Warm
Springs Georgia for Roosevelt to sign.34
Many senators argued that the internal issues of the TVA could not be separated
from the Gilbertsville Dam proposal. Senator John Ditter was perhaps the most vocal in
his disdain for the TVA, opening his statement regarding the dam by saying, “We are
called upon today to pass on a most controversial subject--the proposed extension of the
now rather notorious T. V. A. project.” The dam at Gilbertsville was envisioned by
Morgan to be a “superdam,” the largest in the TVA system, costing around 300,000,000
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dollars. While certain ambitions may have been scaled back, many senators felt that this
was the perfect opportunity to voice their displeasure. This was their chance to deal a
heavy blow to the TVA and the president. Ditter would go on to argue that the very idea
of the TVA was verging on socialism, stating, “Even if the general scheme of
Government ownership of power producing units, with its attendant aspects of a
socialistic .state, were desirable, this extension of generating electricity for a
comparatively small section of the country at the expense of other sections cannot be
justified without a careful scientific study of all the pertinent and material facts and he
urged the rest of congress to vote against the dam until they could find out the “real
purpose of this colossal Federal investment.” This would not be the last time Kentucky
would be thrust into the national spotlight.35
Many in congress, including Barkley, believed that the aversion toward
Gilbertsville was due to the actions of Morgan and his squabble with the board. They
waited a short time, then reintroduced the bill to congress. The dam in Gilbertsville
would be approved by the House on April 25 by vote of 158 to 152. It was close, but a
sharp turn from a month earlier. It was then sent to the president on May 1. Once the
initial controversy of Morgan’s removal blew over, the dam received its funding, but
controversy was not completely over, and it would find its way into the Kentucky
campaign. It was also imperative for the dam to be approved because the TVA had
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already bought over three hundred and fifty acres of land, which would have been a
colossal waste if they were not able to begin work any time soon.36
Some brought to Chandler’s attention that dam might be an issue that Chandler
may be able to capitalize on, and it quickly became apparent that Gilbertsville would be a
focus to some long into the campaign. One Kentuckian, under the alias “Committee
Democratic Taxpayer,” wrote a letter to The Courier-Journal that outlined some concerns
with the building of the dam. They argued that millions of acres of fertile farmland would
be destroyed, and thousands of families displaced. Their final point of concern was the
destruction of mussel beds that provided many jobs for poorer Kentuckians. Another
writer, who went by “Discouraged Democrat” went on to say that the “Democratic
Administration” was “starting another pump priming process.” This, to them, meant
“bigger debts and increased taxes, which will be paid mostly by the ‘little fellow.’” The
dam had stirred up tensions and became a lightning rod of controversy. It would not be
long until Chandler would begin to evaluate whether this was an issue he should push.37
The discussion behind the scenes revolved around the same concerns, but mainly
focused on the displacement of around 20,000 families. One letter stated, “It will displace
and require the removal of twenty-thousand inhabitants of this valley,” and concluded
that, “It is an absurdity, ridiculous and fantastic, and ought never to be considered.”
Chandler’s secretary, Walter Mulbry, sent him these comments with a note that they may
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“make use of the opposition” as a “white elephant that Barkley is foisting on Kentucky.”
He also cautioned that the issue needed further investigation. Mulbry wrote that if “it is
found that the majority of people living in the district that will be flooded are in favor of
the dam on account of the price they would get for their farms, then of course it would be
well to lay off the subject.” Chandler never seemed to pounce on the issue, but there
certainly was a base of his supporters up in arms. The dam engulphed the politics of the
region and placed Kentucky in the national spotlight. It also brought up much of the same
debate that was at the core of the rift in the Democratic Party.38
The early part of this campaign was rife with debate over the meaning American
democracy. There was intense discussion around the excessive spending of the New
Deal. Both candidates immediately made their positions on the new direction that
American democracy was taking. This election became a battleground for the New Deal
and its ramifications. Barkley represented the president and a more powerful executive
and a government that took responsibility for the welfare of the people. Barkley was a
figurehead for a faction of the Democratic Party that subscribed to the idea of an
executive that would take an extremely active role in lawmaking. At the center of this
debate was the shaping of the American democratic system.
Chandler capitalized on the fear and dissent caused by this change. They had been
frightened by the immense debt that the government was racking up and that it may have
all been for nothing. Chandler would balance the budget of Kentucky and tout a fiscally
conservative message thorough the campaign, specifically attacking the philosophy of

38

Walter W. Mulbry to Albert B. Chandler, Box 45, Folder 1, Happy Chandler Collection 1920-1974,
University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, KY; Unknown to W. Hume Logan, Box 45, Folder 1,
Happy Chandler Collection 1920-1974, University of Kentucky Special Collections, Lexington, KY.

31

pump priming. The recession caused by the reduction of many of Roosevelt’s work
programs caused many to fear that “priming the pump” was no longer a temporary
strategy. The concern of many around these issues caused many to speak out against a
president that many frequently refused to speak out against.
While many were concerned with spending, Roosevelt’s relationship with the
court may have been most frightening. This was yet another arena where he was
attempting to expand his reach. His court-packing plan had widened the rift within the
party and among his own advisors. His attempt to vastly change the makeup of the
supreme court would be a driving theme of much of the election. There would also be a
brief controversy over a court seat early in the primary that would ironically see
Roosevelt being pressured by his opposition to make a judicial appointment that would
benefit them and avoid a fight. This would not be the last time that the issue of judicial
appointments would come up from the beginning to end it would be one of the driving
issues of the campaign.
Kentucky was a microcosm of this struggle over the direction of American
democracy, and it would quickly be thrust into the national spotlight. The debate over the
building of a dam in Gilbertsville, Kentucky revolved around all of these issues. It
brought to the forefront many concerns over the president’s powers to appoint and, in this
case, remove personnel of New Deal programs. Many also used this project as an
example of the excessive spending of the government. This was because it was to be the
crowning achievement of the TVA and the most expensive dam the organization was to
produce. The Gilbertsville Dam, however, also brought to light another issue of
presidential power. It would displace thousands of people from the town, which would
32

flood once the dam was built. The president was now removing thousands from their
homes and destroying farmland. This concerned many in the Tennessee Valley and
Gilbertsville would become an outlet for their dissent. The early stages of this campaign
were filled with debate about the direction of American Democracy and many of the
events depict the uncertainty of the place of the executive in American democracy.
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Chapter 2: “Copperheads Among Us:” Roosevelt’s Purge
The sputtering of the New Deal furthered Roosevelt’s ambitions to create a liberal
Democratic Party. The fractures within the party over the expansion of presidential
powers and the increasingly more vocal critics of the president’s plans caused him to take
action. He decided that the best course of action would be to remove these conservative
elements from the party. This would be critical not only for the New Deal but for
American politics as well. The president would now attempt to shape the party into a
model fashioned by the White House. This was one of the most divisive moments of
Roosevelt’s presidency. His attempted maneuvering of party guidelines would not only
divide the American public but the president’s closest advisors as well. Jim Farley would
advocate for a hands-off policy, stating that he “was fond of both Barkley and Chandler.”
He would even tell Roosevelt: “I wish they could both win,” but the president would
decide to intervene anyway.39
The arrival of summer brought with it one of the most important fights of the New
Deal. The Democratic primaries were fast approaching, and Roosevelt prepared for
battle. In July, he announced that he was going to break with tradition and interfere in the
democratic primaries. He would attempt to fight back against the “Copperheads” who
were enacting a “campaign of defeatism” against his programs. This would be the most
critical battle in his attempt to create a liberal Democratic party and to save a New Deal
that was losing steam. He had decided to intervene in several primaries to replace
conservative Democrats with their more liberal counterparts. Roosevelt would take on
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some of the more powerful conservative strongholds of the party in areas like Virginia,
Georgia, and Florida. In most of these cases, he would launch a direct assault. While
Roosevelt’s main goal was to remove conservative elements through removing these
conservative Democrats through the primaries, the opportunity did not always present
itself. Virginia did not hold a primary in 1938, but the state was home to a conservative
machine, led by Harry Byrd, that concerned the president deeply. He would attempt to
extend his influence more subtly in this case by using judicial appointments. He would
also have to defend some of his most important supporters from these insurgents.40
The most important battle, however, was a defensive one. As the summer
approached, Roosevelt saw the need to defend one of his most ardent supporters. The
souring of sentiment toward the New Deal meant that the president not only needed to
spread the influence of liberal supporters, but he also needed to protect them as well.
Chandler’s popularity and defiant nature made the Kentucky race a national spectacle and
a microcosm of the national debate over the New Deal. It would also make it a focal
point of the president’s purge.
During the summer, the economy would see a slight boost, but severe damage had
already been done to the confidence of many New Dealers. Harry Hopkins announced in
1937 that it was reasonable to expect a “probable minimum of 4,000,000 to 5,000,000
unemployed even in future ‘prosperity’ periods.” Senator Fiorello H. La Guardia would
come to the conclusion that “instead of considering the situation as an emergency, we
should accept the inevitable, that we are in a new normal.” The Roosevelt Recession had
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demonstrated to many that the New Deal had eased the pains of the depression but failed
to provide a cure. This caused some conservative Democrats to break with the president
and form a bipartisan conservative coalition. This alliance was comprised of many
southern Democrats, border-state Democrats, and northern senators. Their goal was to not
only slow reform legislation but take control of the party from liberals. They also
assumed that Roosevelt would run for a third term and another New Dealer would be
nominated to take his place. They would defeat the president on the floor of congress
then they would be able to defeat him in a bid for the White House.41
Roosevelt would quickly begin to fight back against conservative Democratic
outcries. He would dedicate a fireside chat to defending his New Deal. The president
pointed out that the dire circumstances of 1933 were in the past reminding people that
“Your money in the bank is safe; farmers are no longer in deep distress and have greater
purchasing power; dangers of security speculation have been minimized; national income
is almost 50% higher than it was in 1932; and government has an established and
accepted responsibility for relief.” He acknowledged that the country was in distress, but
the proper reforms could pull it from its current state. He would also continue his
advocation of the expansion of works projects. He called for measures that would address
the current recession and touted his commitment to upholding the spirit of democracy.
The very idea of the government and its responsibilities had changed. It now took
responsibility for the state of the economy and the welfare of its people.42
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While many were becoming disillusioned with the New Deal and the changes that
were happening within American democracy there were still many that supported it. By
April of 1938 Roosevelt’s popularity was waning, but he was still favored. A Gallup poll
reported that 54 percent of voters supported him, and 46 percent disapproved of him,
while 70 percent of people also reported that they opposed a third term. This could hint at
peoples’ uneasiness in the growth of presidential powers. Republicans and (more
troubling to Roosevelt) conservative Democrats would capitalize on this disappointment
and fear. They began to feel more comfortable speaking out against the president and his
New Deal. One of the core concepts of the New Deal that many began to criticize was
“priming the pump.” Republicans and conservative Democrats alike began associating
the president with socialism and even dictatorship. Chandler would not take his claim this
far, but he would make these fears a focal point of his campaign and promote fiscal
conservatism.43
As March came and went, the governor began to criticize the president and his
New Deal more openly, “becoming bolder in his criticism of the President and the
National Administration.” He very routinely criticized the national administration’s
philosophy of “priming the pump,” which is the concept of using federal spending to
stimulate the economy. “Contrary to the beliefs of some, it isn’t possible to spend your
way into prosperity,” Chandler snapped during a speech at Centre College. He further
argued that many of those who were unemployed were not going to find jobs, regardless
of how much the government spent on them. The governor frightenedly concluded that

43

Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, 305-06; Michael A. Davis, “Politics of the 1930s and the New Deal”
in Interpreting American History: The New Deal and the Great Depression, edited by Aaron D. Purcell.
(Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2014), 46.

37

society was burdened by a “government that is rearing a generation which believes it is
the government's duty to provide for it.”44
With these calls for fiscal conservatism, Chandler began to distance himself
slightly from the New Deal in an attempt to gain the support of those who had become
disillusioned with what they perceived was excess spending by the national
administration. Many Kentuckians had sent him the “Song of the New Dealers, which
voiced their displeasure:
Oh what does it matter that the taxpayers groan
That the burdens oppressive? It isn’t our own
Precious dollars we squander on priming the pump.
They come out of your pocket, you hard working chump!
This poem gets at one of the larger frustrations of the people toward the New Deal. The
Roosevelt Recession shook Americans confidence that “priming the pump” was a viable
way to solve the issues of the Great Depression. Many now believed that the next time
the government would attempt to balance the budget another recession will follow. What
many essentially believed was that the New Deal had provided two of the professed
goals: relief and recovery, but not reform. The governor had walked this line for much of
his career so far. He would continually attempt to paint himself as favorable to the New
Deal, while also appealing to those who had become unhappy with it. This eventually
became much of the story of the “Kentucky New Deal,” Chandler would profess
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sympathy with the national administration but do very little within the state to prove it. In
fact, Chandler’s affinity for fiscal conservatism led Kentucky to be one of the most frugal
in appropriations for relief and welfare.45
Chandler would also attempt to capitalize on people’s fears that Roosevelt was
creating an American dictatorship. A song that was frequently sent to the governor, called
“I’m Tired,” captures this frustration and uncertainty quite well:
I’m tired of every new brain trust thought;
Of the ship of state—now a pleasure yacht;
I’m tired of cheating the court by stealth,
And terribly tired of sharing my wealth.

I’m tired of Elenore on page one;
Of each royal “in-law” and favorite son;
I’m tired of Sistie and Buzzie Dall;
I’m simply—completely—fed up with it all.

I’m tired and bored with the whole new deal;
With its juggler’s smile, its banker’s spiel;
Dear lord, out of all thy available men
Please grant us a Cleveland or Coolidge again.
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Chandler, at this point, most likely went too far in an anti-New Dealer direction to come
back to the middle ground that he intended to occupy.46
All of this mudslinging happened before the race was officially underway, and it
would only continue to become more bitter and personal as both the campaign and the
weather heated up. Chandler and Barkley both signed their candidacy papers in July.
Chandler, almost uncharacteristically, failed to cause a scene or ignite any commotion.
He simply filed the papers and they were signed by a county judge. There were no reports
in and major newspapers of any speech or comments made. Barkley, however, made
quite the official entrance into the race. On the same day that Chandler filed his
candidacy papers, Barkley announced that a speech would take place on June 18th to
officially kick off his campaign. He fought back against many of Chandler’s attacks
against him. One of the governors most prominent charges was that Barkley was too old
for a job so difficult, giving him the nickname of “Old Alben,” He would assert that fresh
blood was needed in Congress, the younger candidate asserted. The old guard had had
their chance. Chandler had also thought he could out campaign Barkley and do more
speeches during the campaign based on their 47
Barkley now went on the offensive: “If there are persons in Kentucky who think
the iron in my blood has rusted away, let them follow me from now until August 6” This
was a reference to his nickname of “iron man,” which he was given due to his reputation
for being able to give many speeches in a single day. Up until this point in the campaign,
he was occupied with work in Washington, however, he would now become fully
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invested in the race and would attempt to prove that he could keep pace with the young
and energetic governor.48
Barkley would also touch on corruption, which was another major issue of the
campaign. He proclaimed to his audiences, “If the road to the senate is paved with
gold…I cannot travel it.” Barkley may have claimed to not be involved in any corruption,
however, both his and Chandler’s campaigns were stained with it. The national
organization behind Barkley would begin to meddle in this election attempting to use
their influence with various New Deal Programs to secure votes for Barkley. The most
prominent program that the national administration attempted to use to influence the
primary election was the Works Progress Administration. Chandler’s campaign manager,
J. Dan Talbott, charged that federal relief programs had become entirely political
organizations, and they were now working in Kentucky to reelect Barkley.49
George Goodman, the Kentucky Works Progress Administrator, vehemently
denied these allegations, stating that “There is no truth in the Chandler campaign
manager’s statement that ‘meetings and conferences have been held in practically every
county of the state by key men in places of importance with the Works Progress
Administration.” However, this statement by Goodman was halfhearted at best. He
referred to Barkley as a “close friend throughout a lifetime,” and even went on to say, “I
personally feel that persons who have been assisted through this program would be
justified in supporting Senator Barkley.” Key men in the Democratic Party certainly were
attempting to use the WPA to their advantage, including Chandler. Thomas Rhea, a bitter
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enemy of Chandler, sent a letter to Urey Woodson, Chairman of the Democratic National
Committee, telling him, “we are having one hell of a time getting any action out of the
W.P.A. In many instances, the Chandler people have control and are trying to take the
W.P.A. over.” 50
Federal relief programs could be used in a multitude of ways to influence the
election. The main way that the organizations used these programs to their advantage was
by threatening needy employees with firing if they did not vote in the correct manner.
Another tactic was to make known who supported the creation of that program. In Laurel
County, bags used to distribute relief commodities were emblazoned with the message:
“PAPER BAGS Donated By FRIEND OF Sen. Alben W. Barkley.” Chandler, while he
may have trumpeted a disdain for these political tactics, was not above using this type of
political persuasion. The governor reportedly increased the number of state employees
and had employees hand out campaign materials He also made sure that some social
security checks were hand-delivered. There was a concerted effort on behalf of those
involved with both campaigns to use relief programs to their advantage, however, it is
difficult to tie this corruption directly to either candidate. There are many instances where
those such as Rhea and Woodson comment that they rarely see Barkley; therefore, this
could all have been happening outside of his realm of knowledge, but it is difficult to
assume that he had no awareness of what was happening, and the same went for
Chandler.51
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The South was of particular interest to Roosevelt due to three advantages they
held: the uncommon longevity of their congressional careers, their disproportionate
numbers, and their commitment to a racial hierarchy. By 1938, many conservatives had
begun to speak out against the president, which included many Southern Democrats.
Their plan for the 1938 primaries was to “take the initiative away from the president.”
There had even been talks about them moving to the Republican party, and the door had
been left open by some Republicans themselves. Arthur Vandenberg extended an
invitation for conservative Democrats to bolt to his party and supported other
conservative senators, but this was not an option for most Southerners. The Civil War had
caused “Republican” to be a dirty word for most in the south. This would mean that they
would have to stay and fight for their party. Roosevelt would, in return, largely target the
South in his purge of the Democratic Party, setting the stage for a bitter battle that would
last decades.52
This “purge” is mostly remembered as the president’s failed attempts to meddle in
several senatorial primaries in 1938 where Roosevelt challenged conservative incumbents
by supporting liberal candidates in the Democratic primaries of 1938. While these
certainly were the most public clashes, the purge extended beyond the removal of
conservative senators. Roosevelt would go to several states and attempt to dismantle their
conservative power structure and create liberal ones for himself through judicial
appointments. One of the larger instances of this was in Virginia. Before the courtpacking fiasco, he had kept his appointments in the state uncontroversial. The major
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conservative leaders, including Harry Byrd, never felt the need to challenge them.
However, by late 1937 this would begin to change, and Roosevelt would begin to attempt
to steer the Virginia government in a more liberal direction.53
In 1938, Roosevelt’s frustration boiled over. The president nominated Floyd H.
Roberts as a federal judge for Virginia’s Western District. He was a New Dealer that
would be “above all things … loyal and faithful.” This incensed Harry Byrd and the other
conservative leaders in the state. This began a fight that would carry over into 1939 and
was mostly led by Carter Glass, Byrd’s Conservative colleague. Byrd would later join in
the fight after he was assured by advisors it would not have a negative effect on his
senatorial bid in 1940. Both sides would lobby with members of the senate judiciary
committee and use the local newspapers to make their case. The Byrd machine would
succeed in denying the president’s nomination, but the most important battle was yet to
come.54
While the president failed to dismantle conservative power structures in several
key areas, the time came to defend one of his most influential liberal supporters in Alben
Barkley. Chandler had become more critical of the New deal entering the summer,
making a final attempt at gaining the support of the disaffected Democrats who were not
quite happy with the president’s grasp for power and the lack of recovery they had seen.
With the arrival of July, the Chandler-Barkley contest reached its peak. Roosevelt
announced that he would visit Kentucky while on his national tour to support various
New Dealers who were up for reelection. It was well known that the president was
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stopping in the commonwealth to support Barkley, however; Chandler would attempt to
wring any positives he could out of Roosevelts visit, and it was imperative that he did so.
Chandler’s chances to win the senate seat looked bleak by this point in the election.
Barkley was in the lead 64% to Chandlers 34%, a slight increase from a lead of 2-1 in
April. The president’s visit would represent the governor’s last chance to steal the
election, which he felt was so rightly his to take. There was a solid opportunity to do this
because polls also showed that 14% of Kentuckians had not made up their mind as to
who they would vote for, and he could win these people over it would make for a close
race. It was improbable but allowed for a glimmer of hope.55
For President Roosevelt, Kentucky would be the most important fight of his
purge, though he would carry on similar battles in other states such as Georgia, which
provided a similar situation. The incumbent was Walter F. George, who had supported
some of the earlier measures of the New Deal that he believed would be particularly
helpful to his state, such as the TVA, National Labor Relations Act, and Social Security.
This did not last, however, and George began to vote against major legislation, which
included the executive reorganization, court reform, and the Wages and Hours Bill. This
positioned Senator George as a “New Deal ally,” rather than a member of the president’s
Democratic Party. This is a category that Chandler would certainly fall under this as
well.56
The challenger was Lawrence Camp, a newcomer to the national political arena.
He had been the U.S Attorney for Atlanta and Attorney general for Georgia (a
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nonelective post). He had seemingly not intended to run but was encouraged to do so by
the president. He would attempt to defeat an opponent that had a long history in Georgia
politics and a strong following in the state. This was too much for Camp to overcome,
and he would be defeated. Roosevelt’s purge was generally unsuccessful in its attempts to
go on the offensive and install pro-New Deal candidates into seats occupied by anti-New
Dealers. His defense, however; was surely better than his offense.57
Susan Dunn places emphasis on this primarily due to Georgia’s reputation as a
Roosevelt stronghold. While this was an important battle, one that Roosevelt would lose,
the fight in Kentucky was even more vital. Roosevelt was on the defensive and if he lost
any more support in congress it would be incredibly detrimental to the New Deal. Also,
Barkley was one of his more consistent supporters and his senate majority leader.
Roosevelt had openly supported his nomination, breaking from tradition, furthermore;
this would have not only been a loss of a seat in the senate, but also a major
embarrassment for the president and his New Deal. This would only have caused more
politicians who had previously refrained from speaking out against the New Deal to
become more brazen in their criticism.58
Shortly before the president’s visit, however, Chandler’s tone changed. He
reminded a crowd: “In 1932, I led the delegation in Woodford County to the State
convention and voted for Roosevelt. In 1936, I led the Kentucky delegation to
Philadelphia, and it voted for Roosevelt and I made a speech seconding the nomination.”
He also called for a political truce while Roosevelt was in the state. In taking these
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precautions, he was setting himself up to soften the blow of Roosevelt’s words of support
toward Barkley and take full advantage of any kind statements directed at himself. He
made note that he had always been a loyal Democrat. When the likes of Tom Rhea and
Ruby Laffoon had bolted from the party ticket and supported King Swope, a Republican.
Chandler’s platform differed in no meaningful way from Swope’s that year, but he could
still charge Rhea with the unforgivable crime of crossing party lines. In essence, he
insisted that he was a New Dealer but had returned “the state government to the people”
and balanced the budget. Former governor and senator J.C.W. Beckham spoke on
Chandler’s behalf and added the president will learn of the “Kentucky New Deal idea of
a balanced budget.” Chandler would go on to assure his supporters that once the president
left the state, he would “pour it on old Alben’s sore back.” Chandler would attempt to
steal this moment as he had done with so many others throughout his relatively short
career. 59
As the president boarded a train several carloads of national political observers
were prepared to follow him to Kentucky, signaling the importance of this battle. The
event had even been touted as the “years No. 1 affair,” as the “dramatic possibilities” of
the Bluegrass State intrigued the nation. The White House contacted Chandler
beforehand to discuss the president’s visit because, as governor, he planned to welcome
the president to his state. This led many to speculate the scene that would unfold when
the president arrived in Cincinnati and stepped on stage with the two candidates, with one
expected to receive an “emphatic thumbs down.”60
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The charismatic governor quickly attempted to insert himself into the situation.
He met Roosevelt's train in Cincinnati and rode with him to Covington. Once they
arrived, the three colossal figures were all together for the first time during the campaign.
One of the more well-known events of Chandler-Barkley contest was the car ride to the
racetrack where Roosevelt would give his first speech. As they entered the car, Chandler,
eager to be seen sitting by the president, reportedly leaped over Roosevelt into the middle
seat of the car, leaving Barkley in the far-right seat. Chandler got his wish, there were
now pictures of him and his famous smile right next to the president in every
newspaper.61
Roosevelt made several stops in the state to remind Kentuckians of the good that
the New Deal had done for them. At his first stop in Covington, the president painted a
stirring image of Kentucky in 1932. He remembered a time when he stood on a train
platform and looked over a crowd. He recalled: “Hunger stared out at me from the faces
of men and women and little children.” Roosevelt then told the crowd that a fellow
Kentuckian had been instrumental in providing relief. The president made it clear that
Barkley had been a friend to him from the beginning. He also asserted that the senator
had fought “valiantly…against doing nothing and in favor of action to meet growing
needs.” This statement may well have been pointed directly at Chandler in an attempt to
combat the image of Barkley that he had attempted to paint throughout the campaign. He
had continually stated throughout the campaign that he was a “man of action” and that
Barkley was a “man of words.”62
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The speech was filled the powerful imagery of poverty also touched on the New
Deal, detailing its effects on Kentucky and the nation as a whole. Roosevelt told the
crowd that “farmers are better off in a hundred ways” and that “many of our states,
because of that help from the national government have got back to the ‘black’ again.”
This was another topic that related to Chandler directly. He had touted his government
reorganization plan that he pushed through the state legislature, which he argued
balanced the state budget. Roosevelt’s main speech in Covington may not have been
filled with direct attacks on Chandler, but it certainly touched on many of the issues
surrounding the campaign. In discussing these issues, the president got his point across
that he favored Barkley.63
The president would also address another theme from the campaign, which was
that of experience. Roosevelt entered into the Kentucky battleground telling his
constituents that the liberal government, the party system, and the nation as a whole,
needed grizzled veterans like Barkley in congress. In front of a massive crowd in
Covington, he proclaimed that he had “splendid cooperation from the senior senator from
Kentucky” and due to the “great national problems” that the country was facing “people
of national experience” were needed. Many people saw this as a battle between an old
and out of touch senator and a young fiery Barkley. The president took this opportunity to
remind them of the advantages of Barkley’s experience and pointed out the work that
Barkley had done in Washington D.C. that benefited his constituents in Kentucky.64
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Though Roosevelt made it clear that he preferred Barkley, he was not too direct in
his criticism of Chandler. He was also careful to not distance more Democrats than
necessary by stating that the governor “deserves due credit for getting his state on a
sound financial basis.” He did not stop there, and would go on to state, “I say to him and I
say to you that I have considered him and do consider him a friend of mine and I think he
has done a good job as chief executive of his state.” Unlike many of the stops on his
purge campaign where he would be supporting a pro-New Deal candidate in a race
against an opponent that was vehemently anti-New Deal, Roosevelt needed to be more
gentle in his criticism. The New Deal was sputtering, and he could not afford to isolate
any more potential supporters. In this case, Roosevelt used a similar tactic to what
Chandler had been using through the campaign. He attempted to present himself as
favorable to the governor but also express that he preferred a different course of action.65
Roosevelt continued his trip through Kentucky with a stop in Louisville, where he
would highlight the federal government’s role in rebuilding the city. He stated that “not
only in the crisis of a great flood but also in the long process of rebuilding, you have
exemplified the spirit of self-help and cooperation between citizens and with the agencies
of government.” This was a major focus of his speech, and he attempted to quell the fears
of federal intervention by demonstrating the good that it had done for them. He even went
as far as telling the crowd “your Federal Government is assuming responsibility.” The
president made an effort to show that the federal government now had a vested interest in
the welfare of the states but was not taking their independence. He made it clear that
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“every community will do as much of its share of the work of flood prevention as the
community can properly afford,” and that the federal government would help make up
the difference.66
The final two stops of the campaign were in Bowling Green and Russellville,
where Roosevelt spoke from the back of his train. These appearances were incredibly
short but garnered the attention of thousands. He took these opportunities to mention
some Kentuckians that had been supportive of him. In Bowling Green, the president
applauded Senator M.M. Logan for refusing to accept a federal court seat and not getting
involved in the campaign when Chandler requested that Roosevelt appoint to a newly
opened seat. He noted that the senator “stood firmly against dragging the Federal
judiciary into a political campaign.” When he arrived in Russellville, he applauded Tom
Rhea’s efforts to relieve the pains of the Great Depression. Rhea was one of Chandler’s
gravest enemies, who he nicknamed “Sales Tax Tom.” These were more examples of
veiled attacks on Chandler, whether they were intentional or not. His speeches in
Kentucky were filled with these types of comments. He refrained from attacking
Chandler directly, but he made it clear that he favored Barkley and disagreed with the
governor on certain points. Chandler would do his best to find ways to take advantage of
these statements, maneuvering to make them seem more positive than they actually
were.67
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The president also touched on the accusations of corruption against both the state
and federal organizations involved in the campaign. He told Kentuckians to vote for their
convictions and that he would be against “direct and forceful orders from Washington”
for federal employees to attempt to influence voters, and he expected state workers to do
this as well. Roosevelt also commented on Chandlers attempt to make a deal to get M.M.
Logan appointed to a court seat. He told the Bowling Green audience that “Senator
Logan, with possible great sacrifice, refused to inject the Judiciary into a political
campaign.” He also mentioned Chandler by name when he said that he “never left
Washington empty-handed.”68
Chandler quickly began damage control, asserting that Roosevelt complimented
him on balancing the state budget and some of his other successes, “yet, they didn’t invite
me as Governor of Kentucky to say any words in welcome to the President.” He
admitted: “I took it on the chin or wherever else they wanted to put it, and now I want
them to take it.” Chandler then began to fire back at some of the president’s statements.
One of the first instances he brought up was Roosevelt’s kind words directed at Tom
Rhea. He told a crowd that in 1935 Rhea “refused to get on President Roosevelt’s train
and insulted the president.” He went even further and said that “the president helped me
balance the budget,” but when Rhea was the governor “these two never seemed to be able
to balance the Kentucky budget.” His most direct and biting criticism was his claim that
Kentucky had paid in $520,000,000 and received only $370,000,000. He argued that “If
every state had paid in as much and got back as little, the National budget would now be

68

“Cheers Greet His Speeches In Kentucky,” The Courier-Journal, July 9, 1938; “Roosevelt Letter Scored
Chandler,” The New York Times, July 10, 1938.

52

balanced.” These statements again put the focus on fiscal conservatism and were more
overtly directed at the president and his administration than previous ones. He also
continued his attacks and warned that Barkley was attempting to increase the power of
the central government.69
The governor would also push back against Roosevelt’s assertion that he would
make a good senator but would prefer Barkley to be renominated. He would, of course,
leave out the latter part of the statement and emphasize the fact that the president
admitted that he would make a good governor. He would fight back against Roosevelt’s
comment that a senior senator was needed, remarking that “You can’t be a senior senator
until you’ve been a junior senator.” This touched on one of the larger themes that was
present throughout the campaign, which was experience. Chandler had often used the
moniker of “Old Alben” as an attack against Barkley. Roosevelt, however, would use this
to his advantage.70
Chandler also capitalized on the president’s lack of attacks on him. “Any time the
president can’t knock you out, you’re all right,” declared the governor. Chandler would
twist the narrative to his advantage as much as he possibly could, and the visit went about
as well as he had hoped for. Once the president boarded the train to leave Kentucky, the
governor made this evident by stating, “We’re in.” 71
Roosevelt’s attempts to replace ornery conservative Democrats were largely
unsuccessful and remain a blemish on his record as president. Many were often unhappy
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with his interference in the primaries and would use it as another example of him
expanding presidential powers and interfering in state and local politics. Roosevelt’s
subversion of state politics not only angered many conservatives, it also infuriated many
New Deal Democrats as well. There were very few positives that could be taken away
from the purge. One of the only moments of the summer that could be viewed in a good
light (though Roosevelt’s influence in the outcome is debatable) was the Kentucky
primary.
Kentucky was placed in the national spotlight with the president’s visit. The
national media clearly took notice of the importance of this primary. The president was
fighting to keep his favored son of the Senate in his seat. If he was unsuccessful, it would
be an incredibly humiliating defeat. The decision to intervene was clear, but how
effective his intervention was is debatable. Chandler’s campaign would only continue to
sputter from this point on. It is hard to assess whether it was Roosevelt’s visit that caused
this decline or the numerous other issues that the governor faced at the end of his
campaign.
Another one of the most intense changes that Roosevelt and his New Deal
brought to American democracy was what was perceived as excessive spending. The
concept of “priming the pump,” or spending in order to get the economy back on track
was now being questioned more than ever. This concept was the very core of the New
Deal. Many people’s confidence in “pump priming” had been shaken by the recession of
1937-1938, or the “Roosevelt Recession.” The president had begun to reduce the size of
many New Deal programs. The WPA, one of the most successful in the nation and
beloved in Kentucky, had cut its rolls nearly in half, from 2.5 million to 1.45 million.
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When a recession quickly followed these changes, many began to wonder if the New
Deal had solved underlying problems of the Great Depression or simply masked them.
Americans became fearful that “priming the pump” was becoming a permanent function
of the government. The recession of 1937-1938 was fundamental to the subsequent
course of New Deal liberalism.72
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Chapter 3: Poison Water, Poison Victory: The Final Months of the Campaign
As the campaign came to an end both candidates would see their fair share of
struggles. Barkley was running out of money to the point that there were concerns about
whether he would be able to finish the campaign. Chandler’s campaign, however, would
completely spin out of control. A seemingly unimportant announcement of the governor’s
illness would balloon into accusations that Barkley had poisoned him. This episode
would engulf much of the final weeks of the campaign. An investigation would find these
claims to be false and many would come to see this for what it was: a publicity stunt.
This would go on to have a larger effect than many would realize. It allowed the faltering
Barkley campaign respite, which allowed for it to slow down and finish despite its lack of
funds. Furthermore, it quelled any concerns that the sixty-year-old Barkley would look
fragile, as photos of his opponent in bed recovering were on the front page of the
newspaper.
Both campaigns were not able to escape the controversy that would envelop the
end of the campaign. Thomas Stokes uncovered an immense amount of corruption within
the primary and published articles containing numerous charges that the WPA was being
used by the Barkley campaign for both support and funds. George Goodman, the director
of the WPA in Kentucky, would investigate these claims and claim them to be false.
Despite this, there was a sense of dissatisfaction and the Hatch Act would be pushed
through Congress years later.
Barkley, Roosevelt, and the New Deal would come out on top in the campaign,
but its victory was tainted. They had merely survived the most pivotal of the 1938
primaries. These claims of wrongdoings only deepened the fractures within the
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Democratic Party. Conservative Democrats would not lay down their arms and give up
on their pursuit for power within their party. While they lost this battle, Chandler put up a
strong fight and posed the first real challenge to a liberal Democrat in several years.
Chandler would even go on to gain a seat in the Senate after Logan would pass away.
Conservative Democrats would continue to make waves and the fractures within the party
would continue to deepen despite their loss in this campaign.
Chandler would become even more desperate as the campaign would draw to a
close. The governor would level one of his more outlandish attacks on Barkley in late
July. On July 22, the governor reportedly fell ill. A few days later, was eventually driven
by ambulance from his hotel room back to Frankfort, where he made a speech at his
bedside. He simply thanked those in his campaign and reiterated that he had not taken
money from anyone outside of Kentucky. Despite some being disappointed that this
would cut into Chandler’s final drive for the nomination, the situation was seemingly not
a large issue. However, the governor’s illness would quickly become one of the more
memorable issues of the campaign.73
The day after Chandler’s bedside address, his doctor dropped a bombshell on the
people of the commonwealth. He asserted that the governor’s sickness was caused by
poisoning and accused the Barkley campaign of trying to remove him from the race. The
story revolved around a pitcher of water. The pitcher was delivered to Chandler, who was
speaking at Kentucky Hotel and mingling with State Finance Commissioner J. Dan
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Talbott, State Lieutenant Jesse Wyatt and B. C. Lee, by a waiter. The three men drank the
water as usual. However, the next morning, Dr. J.W. Bryan, resident physician of the
Kentucky Hotel, was called to the room of Talbott, who had fallen “violently ill.” While
dressing to go tend to the finance commissioner, Dr. Bryan received a second call asking
him to immediately come to the governor’s room. Upon examining the governor, Dr.
Bryan found Chandler dangerously ill. He was experiencing many symptoms, such as
chills, a headache, extremely high heartbeat, and shakiness. He spent much of the day
treating the two statesmen and was informed that Lieutenant Wyatt and Lee were also ill,
although not as seriously.
The doctor pointed to a few particular pieces of evidence to prove that this was
indeed a case of poisoning. First, blood, urine and stool samples showed evidence that
toxic substances were ingested. Second, many other people drank the water at the hotel,
but only the three men who drank from the pitcher fell ill. It was found through an
investigation that the men were likely not poisoned. They deemed that the waiter who
served the water had been loyal to Chandler and that he had no reason to betray him, and
he was the only one who had access to the pitcher. It was acknowledged though, that the
men were most likely made sick by some poisonous material accidentally getting into the
water. The implication here is that some cleaning material may not have been thoroughly
washed from the glass before its use. Their final conclusion was that “there is nothing in
the evidence indicating any crime by anyone.74
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This incident would shape the remainder of the campaign. During the first day or
so of Chandler’s illness, his wife fulfilled his scheduled speaking engagements.
Furthermore, once he was well enough to get back on the campaign trail, he seemed weak
and still a bit sickly. This allowed Barkley to continue giving speeches at his rapid pace
and look more vibrant and healthy than his opponent despite his age. Chandler’s
accusations also gave the brilliant speaker ammunition. In his speeches preceding the
poisoning incident, he would drink from a glass of water that was placed on his podium,
shudder, and push the glass away, much to the delight of those in attendance. This was
the final event in a campaign where Barkley had used his experience and skill to put
himself in a strong position. Now only two weeks before the election he stated, “I have an
opponent but no opposition.”75
The poisoning episode provided relief to an increasingly anemic Barkley
campaign. While the Barkley camp was confident in their ability to win the campaign in
May, there was more uncertainty during the final two months. The consensuses come
July seemed to be that Barkley had the edge, but that Chandler was making a serious
push to tilt the balance of the primary. One Kentuckian warned, “This Race is much more
dangerous than many of the Barkley’s friends realize. With Chandler’s patronage, money
available, and aggressiveness of his campaign, the senator is in real danger.” Chandler’s
abundance of money and the tightly run political machine led many in the Democratic
Party to believe it was possible that Chandler could spend his way to victory.76
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Chandler had a grasp on every area of the state, extending patronage and extorting
funds whenever he could. He deeply aspired to obtain power and control similar what
Huey Long had over Louisiana. He had spent time with Long before his death and with
his associates after his death. A lawyer from Paducah wrote, “I do not value the Barkley
organization very highly. I think Chandler’s is one of the strongest that has been seen in
the State in any Race known to me. He has the highways lined with weed cutters, and his
followers beating the bushes, and leaving nothing undone. The report is that much is
being used even now by the Chandler followers, and that the crest has not been reached
in their flow of gold.” Some thought that the only way that he would win the seat was to
buy it, and Chandler may have been well on his way to doing this. Urey Woodson would
lament that “as a monumental liar, we have never had anything in Kentucky like
Chandler.” He saw that the governor had accumulated a substantial following. This
combined with “unlimited campaign funds and ingenious methods of campaigning,” he
was “giving Barkley a strong race.”77
This fear was compounded by a faltering Barkley campaign that was grasping for
money to survive for a final month. Woodson began to scour the state for donors, but
there were few found. Henry Ward took a vested interest in these struggles and was
shocked to find that little effort had been made in Paducah, Barkley’s hometown. He
assessed that the finance organization was “asleep at the switch.” Ward would also write
to Woodson from the Barkley campaign in Louisville, “We are very handicapped here
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because of lack of funds and therefore not able to give proper attention to all the details
of the election as we should.” Woodson would tell him that he had no knowledge of the
situation in Louisville beyond what he was telling him. He went on to also tell him that
Barkley never got much support from Paducah because all of the “bankers, lawyers, and
others” were nearly all against him.78
While funding was the main concern at the end of the campaign, there was also
fear that Barkley’s age would catch up to him. There were concerns that he would not be
able to keep up with the strenuous schedule, which sometimes included up to five
speeches a day. One man wrote that “He is speaking six hours a day and with his 60
years, and lack of physical preparation if he can hold up at all I shall be surprised.”79
Once Chandler was healthy enough to continue his campaign, the candidates took
parting shots at each other. Barkley stated that “the great issue of this campaign is
whether I have been loyal to that matchless leader in Washington, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt and whether I have upheld and fought for the program which has been pushed
forward under this administration.” He argued to a crowd that the issues were not as
Chandler had attempted to paint them. They were not whether he had been to Europe or if
his daughters married men that were in politics. He also addressed Chandler’s accusation
that he was a coattail rider by saying “Maybe I am a coat-tail rider if to cooperate and
follow the leadership of the president places me in that category, but if I had to choose
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between the coat-tails of Franklin D. Roosevelt and the American Liberty League, give
me those of Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Barkley’s invocation of the image of the president
was an adequate summary of his campaign. He was Roosevelt’s candidate and he would
continue his programs.80
On August 5, the candidates wound down their campaigns with several speeches.
Chandler would give a speech at the University of Kentucky, though it was originally
slated to be given at Cheapside until he was pushed out for a John Y. Brown speech. He
spent the last days of the campaign attempting to make up the time he lost from his
illness and reiterating the message of his campaign. Chandler reminded people that he
was “born between a railroad track in the middle of a tobacco patch” and promised that,
“next year I’m going to straighten out this tobacco quota business.” He then accused
Barkley of using the power of the federal government to override the state’s authority.81
Barkley closed this campaign that saw him travel 10,000 miles in 110 counties
with a motorcade through twenty cities in Western Kentucky. He would then give a
speech in Paducah, where he planned to receive the election returns the next night. He
recounted his record to a crowd and told them that he was “now in a better position than
ever to work for the benefit of Kentuckians.” He then assured them that riding the
president’s coattails was better than riding those of any “New Deal hater” and asked to be
returned to Washington “by the biggest majority ever given a candidate in Kentucky.” He
understood fully the stakes of this election and its importance to the president and his
New Deal’s future. Barkley wanted a large margin of victory to affirm the peoples’
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support for the direction that the current administration was taking the American
government. His nomination would also be a recognition that emphasis had shifted from
the local and state organizations to the White House. By voting for Barkley they were
voting not just for the president, but for the increase in presidential powers and the
federal government’s intervention in state affairs.82
Roosevelt took the push for fiscal conservatism very seriously and put a lot of
effort into ensuring that they were defeated. Though Chandler was able to pose a strong
challenge, he was not able to defeat the federal machine. Barkley led amongst those of
nearly every geographic region and social category. He polled the strongest in Western
Kentucky, where he gained around 60% of the votes, most likely due to his support of the
Tennessee Valley Authority and the various the farm programs of the New Deal like the
Burley quota. He also won by considerable margins in his, Ballard (69%), Caldwell
(59%), Carlisle (73%), Muhlenberg (74%), and Logan (66%) counties as well as his
home of McCracken Counties (78%). There are a few reasons for his success in these
counties. Many of these counties fell under the jurisdiction of the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), which had a profound effect on the region. The TVA could help
control the floodwaters of the Tennessee River, provided better navigation of streams,
thousands of construction jobs, inexpensive power, and recreational facilities. There were
also auxiliary effects as well, such as attracting new industry and tourism; provide
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phosphate and nitrate fertilizers to farmers; improvement of the tax base; allowing better
Schools, roads and bridges.83
To Kentucky, much of this was speculative since most of the TVA’s focus had
been on Georgia and Alabama before 1938. The election, however, happened at a
particularly opportune time for Barkley. He had worked hard to get appropriations for a
TVA Dam to be built in Gilbertsville, which finally received approval, and by July of
1938 there would be nearly 800 workers employed (this would jump to 3000 jobs in the
next fiscal year) and around 10,000 acres of land purchased. In fact, Barkley saw one of
his largest victories in Marshall County (67%), where Gilbertsville is located. West
Kentucky was receiving its first experiences with the TVA and could see its successes
only miles down the river with the recently completed dam at Pickwick Landing. They
also understood that the other TVA Dams lessened the effects of the floods that swept
through the state only recently. The Gilbertsville Dam would not have become reality
without Barkley’s skillful lobbying to the president. Western Kentucky was ready for the
TVA and showed this by voting for the man that would make it happen.84
He also received some support from tobacco-producing areas, winning places like
Bell, Crittenden, Ohio, and Logan counties. Some tobacco counties, however, also
provided some of his largest losses. Chandler won Breckenridge (60%), Hardin (51%),

83

Julian E. Zelizer, "The Forgotten Legacy of the New Deal: Fiscal Conservatism and the Roosevelt
Administration, 1933–1938," Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 30, no. 2 (June 2000): 332; Malcolm E.
Jewell, ed., Kentucky Votes Volume I, Presidential Elections, 1952-1960; U.S. Senate Primary and General
Elections, 1920-1960 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1963), PDF, 30-32; George T. Blakey,
Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 1929-1939 (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1986),
133.
84
Bernard A. Gannon, "Monument to Power: The Political Struggle for Kentucky Dam" (Master's Thesis,
Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, 1997), 243; Blakey, Hard Times and New Deal in Kentucky, 133134.

64

and Meade (54%) counties. The Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) probably had a
major role in why the votes broke down this way. At its inception in 1933, It gained rapid
support, with 90% of tobacco growers were signed-up under the AAA. There were issues
with setting proper quotas for the small farms that were popular in Western Kentucky.
Dissatisfaction with the quotas may explain some of these wins for Chandler.85
Barkley’s other largest victories came in Eastern Kentucky. He experienced great
success in Letcher (79%), Pike (58%), and Perry (63%) counties. Many of Barkley’s wins
in Eastern Kentucky can be attributed to his support of the New Deal’s efforts in securing
the rights of labor. One of the major organizations in Kentucky had been the United Mine
Workers of America (UMW), which had struggled to gain ground in Kentucky before the
New Deal. The National Recovery Administration (NRA) bound many businesses to
Section 7, which would allow mine workers to organize. Many mine operators found a
loophole, so it was not till 1935, with the Wagner Act, that the UMW began to gain
traction and a large portion of miners were in unions by 1935.86
Unionization did not happen without conflict, in fact, there was plenty of conflict
in a few counties. Harlan county had seen outbreaks of violence for years due to the mine
operator’s refusal to allow workers to join the UMW. Chandler had been seen as
relatively friendly to labor, however; he did not support sit down strikes. He eventually
sent the National Guard into Harlan to quell the violence. He had also made it illegal for
private corporations to compensate peace officers. These measures eventually allowed
miners to return to work in Harlan County, and the UMW would even recognize
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Chandler for his efforts in this endeavor. These actions may have been what allowed him
to gain an impressive sixty-two percent of the vote in Harlan County. Chandler had taken
several other actions that made Chandler seem favorable to some in the labor category.
One Kentuckian pointed to Chandler’s abolition of prison-made goods, which no
business could compete with. He also touted that the governor worked to obtain a two
hundred increase in the amount workers were allowed to receive in workman’s
compensation. The final point that was made was that Chandler also supported the Child
Labor Amendment, which was greatly desired by Roosevelt. This allowed some to see
the governor as pro-labor and pro-Roosevelt. This culminated in Barkley having closer
battles in and losing some counties that he had originally foreseen winning.87
The senator was also quite popular among farmers in general, gaining their
support at about 55%. Chandler made his largest gains amongst the wealthy who favored
him at 48%. Chandler’s campaign was not a complete failure, however, he continuously
cut into Barkley’s lead each month since January. In fact, his largest increase in the polls
came the month of July, after the president’s visit. This could demonstrate that Chandler
was able to manipulate the event to help his own cause. Kentuckians, and most
Americans in general, already knew of Roosevelts support for senator Barkley, therefore,
Chandler’s attempts to use some of the president’s slightly positive phrases toward him to
his advantage were most likely ultimately successful. However, while twenty percent of
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incumbents were removed their seats, Barkley’s victory went down as a record-setting
first defeat for Chandler at 294,391 to 223,149.88
Newsweek said of this result:
Once the New Deal issue and the president’s personality had been injected
into the fight, the Barkley-Chandler race resolved into a titanic test between the
vote getting power of Federal funds—WPA and farm benefits—against the
strength of a well-disciplined state machine. The New Deal won… In Kentucky,
Senator Barkley had all the blessings the president could bestow, and New
Dealers with some justification claimed it as a victory. Yet Barkley had a Federal
fund machine… more powerful than Chandler’s state counterpart.

This quote sums up the general essence of the campaign; however, it is too dismissive of
the Chandler machine. The federal machine seemed to struggle against Chandler’s
impeccably ran state machine. Their victory would also cut short due to the measures
they took to keep up.89
During the latter part of the campaigns, charges were leveled that both Barkley
and Chandler’s camps attempted to influence the vote of New Deal employees. Much of
this was uncovered by Thomas L. Stokes of the Scripps-Howard staff of the Cincinnati
Post who reported on many of these charges. George H. Goodman, the state’s
WPA administrator would investigate these claims. He go on to tell the public that there
had been no misuse of the organization: “I am convinced, after investigation, that these
State and district administrative officials of the W.P.A in Kentucky have repeatedly made
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it clear to the W.P.A. workers that their jobs in no way depend upon who they vote for in
a primary election.” The evidence, however, was quite convincing for some of these
charges and would concern many, which would lead to the passing of the Hatch Act, in
an attempt to prevent WPA patronage.90
The WPA was the largest of the depression-era relief programs and came to
symbolize the “alphabet soup” agencies of the New Deal. Many Kentuckians owed a fair
bit to the WPA. It created jobs that often fit their skill sets, which freed them from asking
for what they would have felt was a handout, rather than earning money through hard
work. Louisville Mayor Joseph Scholtz also sang the praises of the WPA in Jefferson
County. He said the city "would be far behind" in many different areas, such as welfare
programs, health, and construction. While it was made with the same intentions as other
work programs of limiting government influence within the economy by not doing
construction projects that would take money from private businesses. The WPA, like
other work programs, aspired to keep wages noncompetitive and by instituting wage and
hour maximums. While these wage restrictions kept morale high, they were not enough
to inspire workers to take much pride in their work. This eventually led to many people
accusing the WPA of paying workers to loaf on the job, allowing it to garner the
nickname We Piddle Around.91
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Kentuckians often shared these sentiments. The Kentucky City magazine asked for
the opinions of local government officials, and seventy-four of them mentioned workers
getting paid for “leaf-raking” and other seemingly nonsense jobs. Governor of Georgia,
Eugene Talmadge recounted a complaint from one of his constituents who summed up
much of the opposition from southerners: “I wouldn’t plow nobody’s mule from sunrise
to sunset for 50 cents a day when I could get $1.30 for pretending to work on a DITCH."
There were also criticisms of the quality of work done on many of the projects. These
were overwhelmingly by unskilled workers who had little motivation to put in any extra
effort. These new national programs created a federal machine that rivaled much of the
local machines that were previously extremely powerful. This became critical in the rise
to prominence of national politics but rubbed many the wrong way.92
Many WPA workers came out and made sworn statements. Some of these
contained large amounts of signatures from other workers as well. These charges often
revolved around getting workers to change their registration. One man in McCreary
County asserted that a foreman had around twenty Republican workers taken to the
county clerk’s office in a WPA truck to change their registration. Goodman acquired a
list of signatures of forty other workers who said they had not been intimidated into
changing their registration. There were, however, similar cases reported in other counties.
In Pulaski County, a foreman was seen in the county clerk’s office thirteen times
checking on registrations. It was also noted that there had been over three hundred
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changes of registration from Republican to Democrat in the county, with around seventyfive of them were WPA workers.93
While at times workers were told to “keep our friend in power,” some of the
attempts to influence their votes straddled a legal line. In Edmonson County, it was
alleged that WPA timekeepers were making “political checklists” with the goal of finding
out their affiliation. Cards were sent out asking for names of legal voters in the family;
addresses; registered, yes or no; and precinct where registered. The timekeeper admitted
that he did send the cards out, but it was not to sway their political leanings. He wanted to
“urge the workers employed by the W.P.A. to register so that they might exercise their
right of suffrage and have a voice in the affairs of their country.” He went further to state
that “the card which each of the workers filled out did not call for any information
concerning political affiliation of said worker.” Many of the workers admitted that they
were asked to fill out these cards, so there was no debate over this. The concern revolved
around whether they were directly prompted to vote for a particular candidate. Never
mind the simple fact that they asked the workers to register was an attempt to influence
the outcome of the primary. The more WPA workers on the rolls, the more people that
they could expect to vote for Barkley. It would also be easy to remind the workers that
the federal government provided them with their jobs. This was, however, deemed
acceptable so long as they were not directly asked to vote for a particular candidate.94
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One of the more interesting charges earned the headline “County Manager for
Barkley ‘Lives’ at WPA Office.” Stoke stated that “A sign nailed beside the entrance
reads: “No Loafing. This applies apparently to everyone except Caspar Ratts, the
campaign manager for Jackson County.” Ratts was alleged to have been spending time in
the McKee County WPA office though he has no connection to the organization. He was
said to also have been working for Barkley amongst the employees and dictating policies.
Ratts denied the charges however several others noted that he had been seen around work
sites. One worker was adamant that he never felt that Ratts was “dictating the policies of
the Works Progress Administration,” but he had been approached by him “in several
instances with suggestions and criticism.” The worker went on to assure that “his
suggestions or criticism have not been followed” and that Ratts had not been seen around
the office for several weeks. Like many of these charges, it was clear that the Barkley
campaign was bleeding into the WPA, but there was no conclusive evidence that anyone
in the campaign was attempting to directly influence the worker’s vote.95
Most of the charges would amount to hearsay and were accompanied by the
drama of disgruntled workers who were looking to get back at foreman who had fired
them. One of the most extraordinary stories was that of Carter County WPA worker,
Volantus K. Burgin. Burgin had alleged that he had been injured and put on lighter work,
per doctor’s orders. However, he was asked to resume his normal duties early because he
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openly supported Chandler. Burgin also stated that the foreman told him if he would
support Barkley, he would be given a higher paying position.96
The head of the WPA project in Carter County recounted a very different story.
Burgin apparently disappeared once the tobacco markets opened. WPA rules stated that if
a worker did not report for five consecutive days they were to be released. The foreman,
Lee Lawson, filled out a form 403 to have his employment terminated and sent it after
Burgin returned to the worksite “half drunk,” flashed a roll of money and stated, “he
could make more money playing poker.” When Burgin received a copy of the form in the
mail, he supposedly got drunk and returned to the worksite again. This time, however, he
proceeded to put a gun to Lawson’s stomach. After a brief struggle, Burgin went down
the road to threaten the project manager in an attempt to get his job back. He would
continue with routine visits for around six weeks until it was finally agreed transferred to
another site.97
While Burgin’s story may have been extraordinary, but it was not the only one.
Affidavits surrounding the charges were filled with stories like these. Some began to
believe that the Chandler campaign and its supporters were taking advantage of
disgruntled employees to give a “black eye” to the WPA and, by extension, Barkley. One
example of the Chandler administration’s possible influence in these charges happened
after two WPA employees were overheard discussing the organization at a Chandler
speech. One worker had mentioned that he would not be surprised if WPA workers did
not vote for Barkley. A precinct chairman, and Chandler supporter, then asked one of the
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workers if they had ever heard their foreman make any political comments at the jobsite.
The man replied that he had made some innocent statements. The next day, a lawyer that
held a position under a federal judge and was a Chandler supporter showed up at the
worker’s home and asked him to make an affidavit.98
At the time there were discussions of how to eliminate political influence within
the WPA. The Wayne County Fiscal Court proposed a reorganization of the WPA in its
county that would appoint an equal amount of Republican and Democrat foremen. They
deemed that this was too drastic a measure and that they would be firing “good men” and
it would be unethical to fire anyone based on their political affiliation.99
This reluctance to remove workers led some to become unhappy with how the
situation was being handled. One worker that had had been found guilty of “political
activity” on behalf of Barkley was by many to have been promoted only weeks after his
wrongdoings were discovered. The supervising compensation adjuster from the Bowling
Green district was transferred to the position of supervisor of all government equipment,
headquartered in Madisonville. Those who heard this felt that he had been promoted and
even rewarded for his helping Barkley. Harry Hopkins had ordered that this worker be
punished, but he did not say how. A site manager would argue that he had been moved to
a position where he would have no contact with the public and that this was in no way a
promotion. There seemed to be no punishment even for those that were found guilty.100
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Another aspect of this probe into the WPA that never seemed to attract much
attention from the public or the Chandler campaign was the fact that George Goodman
was a childhood friend of Barkley’s. He was appointed to head the organization in 1935
after Thorton Wilcox was removed to become the state director of the Kentucky
Emergency Relief Administration. Goodman had no prior experience in relief
administration or public office but was chosen due to his connections to Western
Kentucky and the electoral support he garnered there. The lack of charges may have
stemmed from Wilcox being seen as a “vehicle for republicans.” Hopkins had pushed for
work relief to “save a worker’s skills and restore his self-esteem.” During his time in the
WPA Goodman accrued a record of reducing direct relief and increasing work relief by
tens of thousands in only a few months which, may have helped with the public’s
perception of him.101
Chandler also faced charges of using his position in the state government to gain
votes. Barkley asserted that the governor was deciding where to build roads based on
favoritism. He pointed out that some counties had been completely ignored while others
had received large stretches of concrete roads. Barkley told a crowd that “In more than
100 counties the federal government through the WPA has built the people more roads
than the state administration.” Senator Barkley also alleged that he was doing the same
thing with old age pensions. He had repeatedly refused to raise the allowance, telling
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legislators that the state did not have enough money but put members of his family on the
payroll and spent over $70,000 on the governor’s mansion.102
Circuit Judge, and former Republican candidate for governor, King Swope
criticized both Barkley and Chandler for the “low-level” of their campaign and asserted
that “neither candidate was fit to be a United States senator. Swope would also denounce
the primary as nothing more than a “battle between the national and state treasuries.” He
would be particularly harsh toward Chandler (most likely due to their previous squabble
over the governorship), stating that he “flaps his wings boastfully crows that he has all
the essentials of a winning candidate,” he is a “coward” for being first governor to “carry
with him at all occasions an armed, personal body guard,” and that he had not fallen ill
but was merely taking a “double dose of the Roosevelt and Farley purge.” Swope also
pointed out his populist nature by reminding people that he used to proclaim that he was a
“product of the coal mines of Western Kentucky” but now he was telling voters he “was
born in the middle of a tobacco patch.” Finally, the judge told his audience that
Chandler’s sudden influx in campaign funds might be explained with a review of his
income taxes.103
Swope found that both of them were as guilty as the other. His ultimate
assessment was that neither candidate denied wrongdoing, but each “merely says that the
other has done something worse.” Barkley never denied that a letter was sent out by a
Barkley lieutenant asking for PWA and WPA workers to contribute portions of their
earnings to his campaign. He just argues that Chandler cheated the elderly out of their
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pensions and was having field agents deliver checks. He exclaimed to his audience
“Thank god the people of Kentucky will not be limited in their choice for United States
senator this year to these two self-seeking, self-promoting, mud-slinging, professional
politicians.”104
Barkley also attacked Chandler for his handling of the old age pension. He
pointed out that they were no longer delivered by mail but by state agents who reminded
the recipients that “this money is being furnished by gov. Chandler, and unless you vote
for him Aug. 6 your name will be stricken from the list.” He then lambasted Chandler by
telling his crowd “I want to say to and I want you to tell him—I hope he is listening in
tonight—that any man or woman who takes advantage of the old people of Kentucky to
intimidate and coerce them into voting for any candidate is unworthy of any office in the
gift of the American people.” While both candidates attempted to take the moral high
ground, neither was able to gain it. They were both guilty of manipulating various federal
and state programs to aid their campaigns. Barkley’ manipulation of federal programs,
namely the WPA, was integral to his campaign. Though Chandler was seemingly
outgunned, he masterfully utilized his powerful state machine to keep pace with the
senator.105
In one of the most important battles of the purge, Roosevelt reigned victorious.
His favored son of the senate would eventually return to his seat. This primary fight
brought to the forefront many of the issues facing the president in his quest to create a
liberal, nationally led Democratic Party. Like many Americans, Kentuckians had become
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skeptical of the radical changes that were taking place within the political system. The
president was acquiring more power than ever before and, even beginning meddling in
state elections. The focus of the Democratic Party was moving from local issues to
national ones, leaving many to feel as though their politicians were forgetting about them.
Barkley came to be recognized as the embodiment of the sweeping changes, and
when the people went to the polls, they cast their support for both him and the changes
that had been occurring. Chandler represented for many a descent from what they
perceived as intrusions by the federal government on their liberties. They saw that
Roosevelt was spending their tax money on “priming the pump,” but the Recession in
1937 showed them that this would not solve the problems of the great depression.
Chandler essentially promised to end many of these intrusions. Through this battle in
Kentucky, Roosevelt defended his most important ally in passing New Deal legislation.
The New Deal had prevailed in Kentucky.
The campaign’s end bought anything but a sense of completion. Barkley’s mad
scramble for money and support would lead his organization to utilize the WPA to
influence workers and gain votes. Chandler’s campaign would almost completely derail
with his illness keeping him from making speeches. Furthermore, his accusations that
Barkley’s campaign poisoned him became the focus of the public in the latter stages of
the campaign, which ultimately stunted his progress and allowed for his opponent to
make gains. Barkley would capitalize on this accusation that was seen by many to be a
last-ditch effort by a desperate Chandler to gain votes. Photos of the sickly governor and
his wife on the front pages of every newspaper would only become ammunition for
Barkley.
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Regardless of the outcome, both campaigns were enveloped in controversy after
Thomas Stokes exposed much of the WPA corruption to the general public. Goodman
would attempt to quell the surge of uncertainty caused by launching an investigation of
his own into each individual charge leveled by Stokes. Though he seemed to have an
answer for each accusation it was ultimately unsatisfactory to many and congress would
go on to eventually pass the Hatch Act in an attempt to lessen the amount of political
influence in federal work programs.
The New Deal would leave this campaign victorious, but not unscathed. The New
Deal had merely survived the primaries, and the controversy over the WPA only
deepened 4the fractures within the Democratic Party. It gave the Conservative elements
more ammunition than ever to make a charge for party leadership. Chandler, while he lost
this battle, would eventually, gain a seat in the after the death of M.M. Logan. Most of
all, the New Deal suffered from the bad publicity caused by the controversy. The New
Deal’s largest and most controversial program was only looking worse to many.
Roosevelt’s purge was also seen by many as an embarrassing failure, as he lost almost
every major battle of it. The New Deal had seen more opposition since 1937.
This victory in Kentucky was a bright spot, but it would not save a New Deal in
decline. The program would be able to approve and build the largest TVA dam during
this time, however; this victory would not stop the opposition from speaking out. This is
not to say that anti-New Dealers won this purge. They defended their positions well, and
a number of New Deal supporters won reelection. The real winners of the purge were
Republicans. Democrats had become comfortable with their success, holding a healthy
majority in both the House and the Senate. While they focused on fighting amongst
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themselves Republicans began to capitalize and gain ground. This would be the first of
several consecutive elections where they would gain seats. Republicans were due for a
rebound of sorts due to the unsustainable amount of success Democrats had seen in the
years leading up to 1938 and as distance from the Civil War and shifting coalitions made
people more comfortable crossing party lines. The future success of Republicans was
only aided by the often-ruthless infighting of Democrats.
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Conclusion
The hijacking of this battle between two giants of Kentucky politics demonstrated
how divided the Democratic Party was over the New Deal. There had been an intense
debate for many years, but this all came to a head in 1938. The divisions within the party
had deepened exponentially over the two preceding years, as Roosevelt had become
exceedingly aggressive in his attempts to push his programs through. Many of the
president’s actions concerned Southerners in particular This was mainly due to what they
viewed as an increase in presidential powers. This caused many Southern senators to
surmise that the federal government would no longer continue to turn a blind eye to many
of their affairs, especially in regard to race.
There was also dissent for several other reasons as well. Roosevelt had begun a
battle with the Supreme Court because they had struck down several major pieces of his
New Deal. This would lead the president to attempt to reorganize the Court in a fashion
that would benefit his program. His launch of the court packing plan in 1937 was the
final straw for many. This and his executive reorganization plan made many believe that
Roosevelt was grasping for dictatorial power. Democrats and Republicans alike began to
unify to stop what they saw as the court from being tainted by the hand of the executive.
Roosevelt argued that he was not just trying to fill the court with judges who agreed with
his views, but he was attempting to uphold the very spirit of the court. His line of
reasoning was that an appointment to the Supreme Court was never supposed to be a
lifetime appointment and that turnover of judges was important. Without fresh blood, a
previous generation would control the laws of the current one. These extensions of the
executive branch were not the only things that frighten much of the American public.
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Roosevelt had also pulled back on many New Deal programs in 1937, which resulted in a
fear that the program had not cured the ills of the depression, but merely put a bandage
over the wound. This shattered much of the previous confidence that many had in the
New Deal.106
These issues caused the fractures within the party to deepen and become
permanent. They would come to symbolize the battle between North and South, which
was ultimately rural versus urban, and the battle to make a cohesive liberal party for the
president to push his program through congress. Many Democrats were now becoming
comfortable speaking out against Roosevelt publicly, something they were reluctant to do
only several years prior. This made these divisions explode and become the focal point of
national politics for decades to come. Furthermore, without a unified party, Roosevelt
would have no way of pushing New Deal legislation through congress or combating the
Great Depression.107
Roosevelt could see that the moment of the New Deal was slowing and that he
would need to take action if it was to continue. He would decide to attempt to create a
liberal Democratic Party by pushing the conservative elements out of office. He would
begin to support what he saw as liberal ideals, such as the government ensuring a certain
standard of living and accepting a certain level of responsibility for their citizens. This is
not to say that he wanted to create a single-party state, but that he wanted a liberal and a
conservative party rather than two divided ones. In his quest to achieve this, Roosevelt

106

David M. Kennedy, Freedom from Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945 (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2004), 332-333
107
Ibid, 338.

81

would decide to interfere in the 1938 Democratic primaries. He targeted several
conservative strongholds to dismantle but was almost unanimously unsuccessful. Where
he did succeed, however, was in his defense of his prominent liberal supporter, Alben
Barkley. This was a critical period that would only do more damage to the president’s
reputation, but this key victory and the campaign surrounding it hold an important place
in the purge and warrant study. The Kentucky primary, in particular, was at the center of
American politics and driven by the issues surrounding the division of the Democratic
Party.
Roosevelt’s purge has received plenty of attention from historians as most works
on his presidency and the New Deal or of Kentucky will discuss the primaries and the
president’s interference in them. There have also been works that dealt with the purge
specifically, such as Susan Dunn’s Roosevelt’s Purge. She argues that the most important
battleground was in Georgia due to the fact that it was one of the more powerful
conservative strongholds. While this was an important moment, the situation in Kentucky
eclipsed it and has seen relatively little attention. When many historians discuss the
purge, it receives an honorable mention that lasts a paragraph.
For a short time, Kentucky was at the very center of American. It was a final
battleground of sorts for a sputtering New Deal, Conservatives attempting to keep their
stake within the Democratic Party, and even the very “heart and soul of Americanism.”
Kentuckians had become increasingly skeptical of the president’s program, just as much
of the rest of the country had become. This primary also involved a critically important
ally to Roosevelt in Barkley. He was the president’s senate majority leader who had
helped push much of the New Deal through Congress. Out of all of the defeats, this
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would have been the most embarrassing. Furthermore, while congress was becoming
considerably more anti-New Deal the senate majority leader (one which was handpicked
by the president himself) was still on the president’s side. This episode also allows one to
examine the expansion of presidential powers, the creation of a liberal Democratic Party,
the altered concepts of American democracy, and how Americans coped with these
massive changes.108
Chapter one’s discussion of the early part of the campaign has demonstrated that
peoples’ perceptions of the very meaning of American democracy were changing.
Through the New Deal, the government was now taking responsibility for providing jobs
to those who needed them. Many of these jobs had involved improving infrastructure, but
there were other programs such as the interviewing of slaves and sewing circles. This
caused many to fear that the government was overstepping its bounds, going farther than
providing necessary improvements like roads and courthouses to spending excessively on
what some felt were unnecessary jobs. This was what liberal Democrats would argue to
be the “heart and soul of Americanism” and that a function of government should be
providing help to those in need. However, some believed this concept was being taken
too far and possibly damaging the work ethic of Americans.
Further into the campaign Roosevelt’s purge enveloped both Kentucky and
American politics as he made a trip to the Bluegrass State to support Barkley. Chandler’s
attempts to use the president’s statements and the publicity of this event were successful
in at least softening the blow of him endorsing his opponent. Chandler’s eventual turn to
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a more outwardly conservative stance was also indicative of many others’ reactions to the
president’s interference in state affairs and the excessive spending of the federal
government. Chandler capitalized on this by promoting a middle ground where the
government would provide relief but not go into excessive debt. This moment of the
purge was also important because Roosevelt was defending one of his most steadfast
supporters and, after losing most of the other primaries that he intervened in, this victory
would turn out to be a critical victory in continuing the New Deal. If Barkley was to have
lost this campaign it would have been a near fatal blow to the program.
This victory did not come untainted and there were several controversies
throughout the primary. Chandler came down with an illness in the final weeks of the
campaign and, in a last-minute attempt to gain votes, accused Barkley of poisoning him.
This was a blessing for the senators in more ways than one. These accusations made
Chandler look desperate and week, newspapers were filled with images of a sickly Happy
in bed with his wife next to him. This did not bode well for someone who had made a
major part of his campaign presenting himself as young and vital. It also allowed for the
Barkley campaign to slow down in the final stages, because they had been running out of
money and questioning whether they would even be able to make it to August 6th.
The largest controversy, however, came from both candidates using work
programs to gain votes. Charges were leveled at Barkley that his campaign of threatened
the jobs of WPA workers if they did not support him in the primary. Chandler was not
innocent either, as he utilized his influence over the State Highway Commission to
employ people who voted for him or pave roads in an area that had more supporters.
These charges lead to federal investigations and eventually legislation. While there was
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not sufficient evidence to garner any convictions, the public had more reason than ever to
be afraid that the federal government was garnering too much power and was interfering
in state affairs. Congress would eventually take action and pass the Hatch Act in 1939 to
prevent patronage and the use of funds designated for relief. Kentucky was not the only
state where the WPA was used as a political tool, but it certainly was one of the most
egregious offenders and a major reason for the passing of the Hatch Act.
Many of the country’s issues collided in Kentucky, exploding into a battle within
a Democratic Party filled with the fear, anger, and resentment of splitting at the seams
sewn by the Civil War. It was the culmination of the American public’s struggle to cope
with the growing power of the executive, federal interference in state affairs, and an
increasing national debt. Liberal Democrats won this primary, but this victory caused its
own issues with much of the controversy surrounding it, which ranged from patronage to
accusations of poisoning. It did, however, exemplify the battle within the Democratic
Party and the attempt of the liberal faction to take ownership of the South. World War II
would soon garner the full attention of the public and pull the country from the Great
Depression. Once the war ended, Republicans took advantage of Democrats not being
able to quell the fears of Southerners and gain control of their party. By the end of the
1960s Republicans would eventually lay claim to the South and only tighten its grasp in
the decades that followed.
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